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Summary 
Freight transportation is generally a very complex domain where several players, 
each with its own set of objectives, act and operate at various decisional levels. 
There are different players in the field. The shippers who decide how much of each 
commodity to move from every origin to every destination and the means by which 
the goods will be moved. The carriers who respond to this transportation demands 
and route freight over the actual transportation network under their control. Finally, 
the government defined as the set of international, national and local authorities 
involved in any way with freight transportation via regulation and the provision of 
transportation infrastructure. In this work, we consider the case where only one 
shipper determines the demand for transportation over a network. However, he 
cannot decide fiow levels on arcs in a fully independent way due to the presence of a 
second agent controlling some links of the network and optimizing her own objective 
function. This situation is modelled as a game between two players P and Q acting 
on the same network G. Player P fixes the fiows on the arcs of Gin such a way that 
their divergence at some given nodes (sources and sinks) is equal to prescribed values. 
Such divergences may represent demand and availability levels for some commodity. 
On the other hand, player Q decides the values of the maximum capacities of some 
arcs of the network. Both players are interested in the fact that the connectivity 
between the sources and the sinks in the network is respected, i.e., they bot h want 
that the goods can reach their destination. However, they have different objectives. 
Player P aims at minimizing the transportation costs, whereas player Q aims at 
maximizing her profit (or, in generai, her utility) t ha t is proportional t o the fiow 
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passing through the arcs under her control. Note that, in general, the profit of player 
Q is not assumed to be equal to the cast of player P far the same are. Such game 
between players P and Q is modelled as a minimum cast flow problem for player P, 
where the are costs are given and the player Q decides the are capacities. 
The modelling of the games under investigation are mainly based upon three 
different research lines. First, the players understand the freight transportation 
system as a system where the actors involved do not act simultaneously and they 
explicitly take into account the sequential nature of the interactions among them. 
Second, they play a (hierarchical) game aver a flow network which causes severe 
limitations and constraints to their action sets. Finally, the games exhibit linear 
characteristics and can be solved using bilevel linear programming. All these issues 
have already been discussed in the scientific literature, even though in different 
separate contexts. The merging of three mentioned approaches in only one single 
framework is a major contribution of our modelling perspective. Furthermore, bilevel 
programming is rich of theoretical results and numerical algorithms, but is scare in 
actual applications. From this point of view, the present work might be considered 
as an interesting addition to the field. 
Bilevel noncooperative games in which one player ( called the leader) declares his 
strategy first and enforces i t o n the other players (calle d the followers) w ho react 
(rationally) to the leader's decision are referred to as Stackelberg games. Since the 
payoff functions and all the constraints in our Stackelberg games may be expressed in 
a linear form, these games will be formalized as bilevellinear programming problems 
(BLPPs). In general, bilevel programming problems are diffi.cult to sol ve because 
of their inherent non-convexity and non-differentiability. To face their NP-hard 
nature, we identify some properties of the game solutions which allow us to define a 
heuristic algorithm restricting its (local) search on the set of the Nash equilibrium 
points. The optimal solution of any BLPP lies on a vertex of the leader's inducible 
region. Relying on this result, we develop an algorithm which allows to move from 
a starting point of the shipper's inducible region to another point in the shipper's 
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inducible region always providing a better solution for him. When no further better 
points may be attained, the algorithm stops. Unfortunately, only a local optimum is 
identified. The rationale behind the algorithm stems from the consideration that the 
optimal solution for our BLPP is also a Nash equilibrium point. In particular, the 
algorithm moves from a Nash equilibrium point to another better Nash equilibrium 
point of the BLPP under study. 
This framework may describe, as an example, the situation where restrictions 
are imposed by some alpine country on the number of trucks allowed to cross it by 
road each year. A different context involving the presence of a second agent on the 
shipper's network occurred when the International Transporters' Association (UND) 
of Thrkey had to face when the war in the Balkans started. This situation motivates 
our investigation on hierarchical noncooperative network games. The road freight 
traffic from Turkey to Centrai and Western Europe and viceversa suffered major 
disruptions because of the war in Balkans during the nineties. UND is the shipper 
controlling the quasi-totality of this traffic thus assuming the role of player P. H e 
had to cope with an "adverse entity" able to modify the available capacity on some 
specific links his vehicles had to pass through. The region involved in the conflict 
may be represented as a connected subnetwork disconnecting the origin and the 
destinations of the road transportation network since alternative road routes are 
not easily affordable. Other possibilities, like the seaborne links now operating, did 
not exist at that time. Hence the whole freight traffic was performed using a single 
mode of transport. The models developed in this work allow the shipper to perform 
a worst-case analysis at the strategie level for this situation assuming that player Q 
wishes to maximize the costs he has to afford when going through the region under 
her control. In fact, it is meaningless to talk about the utility or the profit the war 
may seek to maximize. However, it becomes a sensible modelling when the utility of 
player Q is strictly related to the costs afforded by player P on this portion of the 
network. If player Q is maximizing her utility which corresponds to player P's costs, 
automatically she plays to maximize player P's costs. Hence the model represents 
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a worst-case analysis for player P. 
A simple graph composed of 99 nodes and 181 arcs is presented. Player P 
controls a subnetwork composed of 100 arcs. The others 81 links representing the 
connections within the Balkans and Eastern Europe forma connected subnetwork. 
Only the main road links ha ve been considered ( motorways or highways). The 
capacities are calculated taking into account the total number of transit permits 
available for each country. This figure is annually fixed in bilatera! Joint Committee 
Meetings. Player P's costs are the average generalized costs derived as a function of 
lengths and transfer times in the physical links. Player Q does not have profits or 
losses for the flows passing through the P zone and it is also assumed that the profits 
she earns for each unit of flow going through the arcs under her control are equal 
to the costs afforded by the shipper when traversing these arcs. All the relevant 
data required to calculate these figures are collected in the UND Annual Sector 
Report 1997-98 (1999). The heuristic algorithm has been tested on this network 
and its results have been compared with the outcome obtained by using an exact 
enumeration procedure. Since i t turns out that the percentage error of the heuristic 
algorithm is equal to 0,3%, we may claim that its performances are certainly highly 
satisfactory, at least in this specific example. 
Different extensions of the models and the algorithm developed may be easily 
envisaged both from the theoretical and the application side. These advances would 
provide either faster local or global search algorithms either more complete models 
representing in deeper detail the actual system and the interactions among the actors 
involved. Hence a decision support system for the shipper's decision making process 
at the strategie level can be built and effectively used by freight transportation 
practitioners. 
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Esposizione riassuntiva 
Ogni sistema di trasporto delle merci si presenta generalmente molto articolato 
e complesso: in particolare l'esistenza di numerosi soggetti che, a diverso livello 
e con diversi obiettivi, sono tenuti ad operare decisioni rappresenta un elemento 
che influisce in maniera spesso importante sull'assetto del sistema stesso. Il lavoro 
prende in esame un sistema di trasporto merci con due attori, denominati P e Q, 
che attraverso le rispettive decisioni determinano l'assetto dei flussi sulla rete. Il 
soggetto P, in particolare, è incaricato di soddisfare una data domanda di trasporto 
(ad esempio espressa mediante una matrice O /D data) e può decidere come ripartire 
i flussi su una rete multimodale della quale percepisce i tratti fondamentali. Al 
momento della sua decisione, P conosce il costo generalizzato degli archi della rete 
e cerca di minimizzare il costo totale del trasporto. Inoltre il giocatore P deve 
rispettare le decisioni del giocatore Q. Il giocatore Q, che controlla una porzione della 
rete che connette le origini alle destinazioni di P, invece conosce il profitto unitario 
che deriva dal transito veicolare sui suoi archi e cerca di massimizzare il proprio 
profitto complessivo. Nel far questo può modificare la capacità degli archi della sua 
sottorete, ma anch'egli deve comunque soddisfare la condizione di bilanciamento ai 
nodi e deve rispettare le decisioni di P. 
Quale primo elemento di originalità del presente lavoro può essere considerato il 
tentativo di condensare in un unico approccio alcuni elementi presenti singolarmente 
in filoni diversi. Infatti, tra i modelli della letteratura che intendono rappresentare 
esplicitamente le dinamiche decisionali interattoriali si ricordano i modelli multi-
attoriali sequenziali, i giochi su rete e la programmazione lineare bilivello i quali 
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formano il quadro di riferimento in cui la presente lavoro si inserisce. 
Il quadro attoriale appena delineato offre l'opportunità di affrontare una serie 
di problemi diversi, nel campo dell'affidabilità della rete, a seconda dell'ordine con 
il quale i due giocatori decidono. Infatti il caso in cui la decisione di P preceda 
quella di Q può essere significativo, per P, al fine di valutare la peggiore situazione 
che potrebbe presentarsi per effetto di Q una volta stabilito l'assetto dei flussi sulla 
propria rete. È questo un tipico esempio della cosiddetta "worst case analysis". 
Viceversa, se gioca prima Q, P riesce a determinare il migliore assetto dei propri 
flussi nel rispetto di vincoli imposti da Q su una parte della rete interposta tra la sua 
origine e la destinazione. Si pensi ad esempio alla problematica dell'attraversamento 
di Paesi, quali Austria e Svizzera, che impongono severe limitazioni per i veicoli 
pesanti. 
Il problema descritto viene formulato come un gioco su rete nel quale i due 
giocatori, P e Q, non cooperano tra loro. Si ottiene così una formulazione di pro-
grammazione lineare bilivello (BLP) dove il giocatore che gioca per primo è il leader, 
mentre l'altro assume il ruolo di follower. Ricordando che i problemi BLP sono NP-
hard, è stato sviluppato ed implementato un algoritmo euristico di ricerca della 
soluzione ottima. Sfruttando però l'osservazione che, nel particolare caso in que-
stione, la soluzione ottima del problema BLP è anche un punto di equilibrio di Nash, 
l'algoritmo restringe la sua ricerca nell'insieme dei punti di equilibrio di Nash. Da 
un punto di equilibrio di Nash si passa ad un altro corrispondente ad una soluzione 
"migliore" per il leader fino a quando l'algoritmo non si ferma. Purtroppo però non 
si è sempre in grado di determinare un ottimo globale, ma solamente un ottimo 
locale individuando così, nel caso sia P a giocare per primo, un limite superiore alla 
soluzione ottima. 
Lo studio di tale modello è stato motivato dalla volontà di rappresentare, con 
riferimento al sistema del trasporto merci su gomma tra la Turchia e l'Europa Oc-
cidentale, la situazione che si è venuta a creare nella regione dei Balcani a causa 
dei recenti eventi bellici. Tra le due regioni, annualmente, si registra un traffico 
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dell'ordine delle centinaia di migliaia di veicoli commerciali. Per ragioni di sem-
plicità, si è fatto riferimento alla sola componente verso l'Europa, fermo restando 
che la direzione opposta potrebbe essere analizzata in maniera del tutto analoga. 
Nell'esempio affrontato, la domanda di trasporto delle merci, che viene misurata in 
numero di veicoli all'anno, e che si sposta con origini diverse nel Sud-Est asiatico 
e destinazioni pure diverse nell'Europa Occidentale, è stata concentrata in due sole 
polarità (l origine e l destinazione). Nel sistema appena descritto l'Associazione In-
dustriali della nazione di origine (UND) svolge il ruolo di decisore centrale ed è stata 
assimilata al giocatore P di cui sopra. In breve, nota la domanda da trasportare, 
l'UND decide la distribuzione delle merci tra vari percorsi sulla rete che collega 
l'origine (Turchia) alla destinazione (Europa occidentale). Conosce pure il costo 
generalizzato degli archi di tale rete e opera le proprie decisioni con l'obiettivo di 
rendere minimo il costo del trasporto. L'evento bellico ha causato, come riflesso su 
detto sistema, una decisa modifica alla capacità degli archi di una porzione della rete 
stradale iniziale, che garantiva la connessione tra origine e destinazione. Alcuni archi 
sono stati eliminati (la rispettiva capacità posta pari a zero), altri hanno subito una 
netta riduzione della capacità, o un significativo aumento del costo generalizzato. 
La guerra quindi ha assunto un comportamento analogo a quello del giocatore Q. 
In questo caso però, non ha significato parlare di un'utilità che la guerra cerca di 
massimizzare secondo quanto esposto in precedenza, a meno che non si proceda ad 
assimilare l'utilità del giocatore Q con i costi di P: se Q gioca per massimizzare la 
propria utilità e quest'ultima corrisponde ai costi di P, automaticamente Q gioca 
per massimizzare i costi di P e il modello acquista proprio il significato di una analisi 
del caso peggiore per P. 
La rete considerata è stata semplificata in accordo con il livello di dettaglio 
delle informazioni di cui dispone P ed è formata da 99 nodi e 181 archi, di cui 
solamente 100 sotto il controllo di P. Gli altri 81 archi, concentrati nella regione 
dei Balcani, sono sotto il controllo di Q e costituiscono una sottorete connessa, che 
disconnette l'origine dalla destinazione. La capacità degli archi è stata determinata 
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in accordo con il numero dei permessi di transito annui che ogni Stato concede ai 
veicoli turchi. Tale numero viene annualmente definito, mediante contrattazione tra 
le parti, in accordi bilaterali. In questa fase non si è tenuto conto delle differenti 
tipologie di permessi. In accordo con alcune necessarie ipotesi semplificative, la 
rete stessa è aciclica. I valori del costo per veicolo percepito da parte di P per 
transitare sugli archi della sottorete propria od altrui rispettivamente, sono stati 
determinati come funzione del costo monetario, della lunghezza fisica dell'arco e del 
tempo di percorrenza, tenendo in considerazione le varie voci che concorrono alla 
formazione del costo unitario (per veicolo-chilometro) di produzione di un servizio 
di trasporto sull'arco preso in esame. Per quanto riguarda i termini che compaiono 
nella funzione obiettivo di Q, si suppone che la guerra non tragga beneficio alcuno 
dal transito dei flussi veicolari sulla rete di P, mentre il profitto di Q è stato posto 
pari al costo sostenuto da P cambiato di segno come descritto in precedenza. Ai 
fini di valutare le prestazioni dell'algoritmo, il medesimo problema, viste le sue 
contenute dimensioni, è stato risolto anche con un algoritmo esatto, cioè in grado di 
determinare l'ottimo globale. Il risultato dell'algoritmo proposto si discosta di solo 
lo 0,3% dal risultato ottenuto con una procedura di branch and bound. L'esempio 
applicativo ha consentito di comprendere le potenzialità dell'approccio proposto e 
nell'ottica di un suo utilizzo concreto ha fornito delle utili indicazioni su possibili 
sviluppi da intraprendere legati sia all'algoritmo, sia al modello sia al caso di studio. 
In conclusione, il lavoro presenta un modello per la definizione dell'assetto del 
sistema di trasporto delle merci, con la trattazione esplicita delle dinamiche deci-
sionali interattoriali. In particolare si prendono in considerazione due soggetti, che 
operano scelte in sequenza gerarchica, uno dei quali agisce per minimizzare i costi to-
tali del trasporto e l'altro cerca invece di massimizzare il proprio profitto che dipende 
dal volume di traffico lungo gli archi sotto il suo controllo. Si propone una formu-
lazione di programmazione lineare bilivello, per risolvere un gioco infinito statico 
non cooperativo con insiemi di vincoli accoppiati. Sono descritte le condizioni di 
esistenza e alcune proprietà dei punti di equilibrio di Nash, dalle quali discende un 
lO 
algoritmo di ricerca di un ottimo locale. Viene infine discussa un'applicazione del 
modello al caso del trasporto merci dalla Turchia all'Europa. Alcuni futuri sviluppi 
sono possibili. Essi portano alla progressiva eliminazione delle assunzioni sempli-
ficative che sono state adottate allo stato attuale nella formulazione del modello. In 
particolare si tratta della configurazione della rete, della struttura e delle proprietà 
dell'algoritmo (oggi trova solamente un ottimo locale). Inoltre si intende procedere 
con il perfezionamento del caso di studio. 
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Chapter l 
The transport system 
Freight transportation is generally a very complex domain where several players, 
each with its own set of objectives, act and operate at various decisional levels. 
Since it has to adapt to rapidly changing politica!, social and economie conditions 
and trends, accurate and efficient methods and tools are required to assist and en-
hance the analysis of planning and decision-making process (Crainic and Laporte, 
1997). There are different players in the field. The shippers who decide how much 
of each commodity to move from every origin to every destination and the means 
by which the goods will be moved. The carriers who respond to this transporta-
tion demands and route freight over the actual transportation network under their 
control. Finally, the government defined as the set of international, national and 
local authorities involved in any way with freight transportation via regulation and 
the provision of transportation infrastructure (Harker an d Friesz, 1986). Because of 
the complexity of transportation systems, the different decisions and management 
policies affecting their components are generally classified in three main planning 
levels. First, strategie planning determines generai development policies and shape 
the operating strategies of the system. International shippers, consulting firms, 
transportation authorities are committed in this type of activity. Second, tactical 
planning aims to ensure, over a medium term horizon, an efficient and rational allo-
cation of existing resources in order t o improve the performance of the w ho le system. 
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Finally, operational planning is performed by local management in a highly dynamic 
environment where the time factor plays an important role and detailed representa-
tions of vehicles, facilities and activities are essential ( Crainic and La porte, 1997). 
This general framework holds at each planning level but has to be appropriately 
adapted to the transportation modality the players are considering for transporting 
goods. In particular, when focusing the attention on a road freight transportation 
system, the decisions of any player heavily rely on the status of the transport net-
work h e normally operates o n. U nforeseen events may suddenly occur, producing 
relevant deviations of the actual behavior of the vehicle fleet from the expected one. 
Unexpected situations encompass either abnormal (or exceptional) events such as 
natural or man-made disasters, huge accidents, large-scale maintenance works, or 
normal (or regular) events su eh as usual variations in the traffi.c demand an d road 
capacity like congestion during peak period (see, e.g., Bell, 1999, and Iida, 1999). 
This is why an analysis of the network reliability should support the firm decision 
maker not only at the operationallevel, but at the tactical and strategie levels, as 
well. Connectivity reliability, i.e., the probability that there exists a t least one path 
without disruption or unacceptable delay to a given destination, and travel time (or 
performance) reliability, i.e., the probability that traffi.c can reach a given destina-
tion within a stated t ime, are the principal issues in network reliability ( again, see 
Bell, 1999, and Iida, 1999). 
In this work, connectivity is granted, i.e., i t is supposed that i t is always possible 
to reach the desired destinations. Instead, attention is focused on performance reli-
ability which is expressed in terms of costs to be afforded by the shipper (needless 
to say, such costs can also model delays). We consider the case that the demand 
for transportation aver the network is determined by only one shipper. However, h e 
cannot decide flow levels on arcs in a fully independent way due to the presence of a 
second agent controlling some links of the network and optimizing her own objective 
function. This framework may describe, as an example, the situation where restric-
tions are imposed by some alpine country on the number of trucks allowed to cross i t 
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by road each year. On one side, the aim is to reduce air pollution. On the other side, 
the country makes a profit from each vehicle traversing i t due to e.g., toll collection 
or use of restaurants, hotels and petrol stations. A different application involving 
the presence of a second agent on the shipper's network is described in deeper detail 
in Chapter 6. In that case, the shipper is the International Transporters' Associ-
ation (UND) of Turkey requiring to manage approximately 100.000 freight trucks 
per year in the European road network. Due to the Balkan war in the nineties, we 
consider the other player as an "adverse entity" (i. e., the war) introducing major 
limitations on the link capacities. 
1.1 The two players 
W e model this kind of situations as a game between two players P and Q acting on 
the same networ k G. Player P fixes the flows o n the arcs of G in su eh a way t ha t 
their divergence at some given nodes (sources and sinks) is equal to prescribed values. 
Such divergences may represent demand and availability levels for some commodity. 
On the other hand, player Q decides the values of the maximum capacities of some 
arcs of the network. As previously stated, both players are interested in the fact 
that the connectivity between the sources and the sinks in the network is respected, 
i. e., they both want that the goods can reach their destination. However, they 
have different objectives. Player P aims at minimizing the transportation costs, 
whereas player Q aims at maximizing her profit (or, in general, her utility) that is 
proportional t o the flow passing through the arcs un der her control. N o te t ha t, in 
general, the profit of player Q is not assumed to be equal to the cost of player P for 
the same are. Such game between players P and Q is modelled as a minimum cost 
flow problem for player P, where the are costs are given and the player Q decides 
the are capacities. The game may be generalized assuming that player Q controls 
both are costs and capacities. However, such a possibility is out of the scope of this 
work. 
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1.2 Main assumptions 
The problem we face is the assignment of a known and fixed demand of freight on 
a specific network aiming at minimizing the total transport cost on this network. 
Freight fiows on each are may be measured in terms of number of vehicles or amount 
of tons passing through i t in a given period of time. W e operate a t the strategie level 
where the time horizon under consideration is not restricted to a period compara-
ble to the trip time. Hence we may neglect the individuai behavior of the carriers. 
In addition we assume, as usual in freight transportation, that the units of fiow 
do not have any autonomous decisional capability. As a consequence, the models 
we develop cannot be considered User Equilibrium or Network Loading Assignment 
Models fulfilling the condition expressed by the First Wardrop's Principle. Instead, 
we deal with and extend System Optimum Assignment Models leading to a solution 
which complies to the Second Wardrop's Principle (see, e.g., Cascetta, 1998). Fur-
ther assumptions are also taken into account thus strictly defining the applicability 
environment of the present work. In the following subsections we introduce and 
justify them. 
1.2.1 Costs 
At the strategie level any shipper is generally not interested in the precise identifi-
cation of the operational details each carrier or each vehicle has to examine when 
performing its journey. In fact, he considers only an aggregateci representation of 
the network goods have to pass through and makes the assignment of the total 
freight fiow to each are of the entire network just once each large period of time 
( e.g., month or year). Hence some phenomena, like for instance congestion effects, 
which might have short-time infiuence on road freight fiow can be neglected, espe-
cially when observing shipments non restricted to an urban environment. In this 
context, the generalized costs associa t ed to each are may be correctly represented 
only considering their average values. Of course, if deviations from these mean val-
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ues are relevant also at the strategie level, a stochastic model has to be introduced. 
In this work we assume that the shipper's view fulfills the conditions allowing to use 
a deterministi c m od el w h ere the (aver age) generalized costs do not depend oh the 
flow. 
1.2.2 Q disconnects sources and sinks 
In a real transportation system it is highly unlikely that the shipper does not have 
any possibility but passing through the zone controlled by the adverse player Q. 
However, some exceptions may exist. As an example, consider the case of Finland 
whose two-thirds of overseas freight traffic goes by ship (source: The Ministry of 
Transport and Communications of Finland). All its vehicles transporting freight 
t o/ from Euro p e heavily relies o n sea transportation because of the high costs in 
terms of time and network unreliability that the alternative road or railways travels 
would require. A similar example involving a large amount of freight transport 
using links which are not fully controlled by the shipper occurs when large islands 
far apart from the continent, e.g., Sardinia, are considered. In both cases, sea an d 
weather conditions may affect the traffic. Hence under specific circumstances, the 
sea is the adverse entity a considerable amount of traffic must go through and whose 
are capacity may significantly vary, at least when observing short periods of time. 
The road freight traffic from/to Turkey to/from Western Europe faced to some 
extent similar problems when the war in the Balkans unexpectedly erupted in the 
early nineties. In fact, the capacity of some of the road links was going to be modified 
for a substantial long period of time and no viable road or railways alternatives 
existed. 
Similar issues also arise when the shipper acts on a network where the capacity of 
(part of) its links is fixed by administrative or environment al regulations like, e.g., 
the number of road permits for heavy goods vehicle traffic in different European 
countries. This is the perspective any international shipper operating across the 
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Alps has to face. In fact, he does not have any choice, but traversing countries where 
the maximum number of trips per year is imposed, either by severe restrictions (road 
permits) either by the capacity of alternative train links. As in the previous case, 
also in this context any variation of the road are capacities holds for a significant 
period of time since they comply either to national and international legislations 
either to bilatera! or multilateral agreements. 
This work explicitly addresses the situation where all the flow must go through 
the region controlled by the adverse entity. In practice, player Q arcs form a sub-
network disconnecting shipper's sources and sinks. The whole shipper's network 
will be referred to as a disconnected network. Of course, when the adverse player 
too heavily affects shipper's operations, he may decide, if possible, to modify the 
network topology, e.g., by adding new links, or to divert part of his freight traffic 
to other transport modes. When this decision can be taken, the shipper has the 
possibility to choose among two or more parallel and alternatives different modes 
of transport connecting his origins with its destinations. As an example, consider 
the case in which the freight traffic between the same O /D pair can be made either 
by road or by railways or, as in the freight traffic case study which motivated this 
work (see Chapter 6), by sea. When the two modes are independent in the sense 
that freight leaves origin and arrives at the destination on the same transport mode 
and without any intermodal operation, the whole shipper's transport system may be 
split and each mode may be considered separately. In this context, our work focuses 
its attention on a single mode, namely on the relationships between the shipper and 
an adverse player acting on that specific shipper's monomodal network. A study of 
the conditions requiring these actions and an investigation of their consequences on 
the shipper's transport system at the strategie, tactical and operational levels are 
certainly very interesting an d actual issues. However, they go beyond the scope of 
this work and may be considered as further extensions of it. 
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1.2.3 Acyclic network 
The units of flow are not allowed to cycle, i.e., from any given node they cannot pass 
again through the same node. This assumption eventually rules out (see, e.g., Ahuja, 
Magnati and Orlin, 1993) the possibility that the units might go in both directions 
between any pair of consecutive nodes: only one direction among them is allowed. In 
a transportation context, this hypothesis may be considered unusual and unnatural 
because of the possibility to reach a given destination using different paths which 
might cross some specific links in apposite directions. However, this assumption is 
made for computational purposes, only. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the property 
identifying an equilibrium point for the games under study relies on the solution of a 
Minimum and Maximum Cost Flow Problem for player P and Q, respectively . It is 
well known (see, e.g., Ahuja, Magnati and Orlin, 1993) that solving a maximum cost 
flow problem with positive are costs is a NP-Hard problem if the graph is not acyclic. 
Thus by dropping this assumption computational difficulties would arise without 
adding any value or further information to the theoretical results we obtained. Of 
course, if the model of the transportation system under consideration necessarily 
requires the presence of directed cycles, the appropriate algorithms should be used 
and the theorems and properties in Chapter 5 accordingly modified. 
1.2.4 Sequential decisions 
A further important issue in this work concerns the instants of time the two players 
take their decisions. When assigning the flow on his network, the shipper either 
has to react to a previous move of the adverse player either he knows how she 
would react to his move and he tries to prevent her behavior aiming at minimizing 
the inconveniences he may suffer. In this framework, simultaneous actions are not 
considered because in our transportation environment they are meaningless. In fact, 
at the strategie level the shipper either prevents or reacts to a steady situation. The 
usual decision making process may be depicted as follows: first, the shipper tries to 
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prevent the hostile attitude of his adverse player making a fiow assignment on the 
network under concern. He assumes to be perfectly informed about her behavior. If, 
for any reason, the evil entity changes her mind thus affecting the actual assignment, 
the shipper tries to do his best to react to this new situation. In practice, we assume 
that the system is in a steady state which lasts significantly more than the decision 
making process of both players generating it. 
1.3 Case study 
The models developed in this work partially motivate considering some specific 
aspect of road freight traffi.c among Turkey and Western Europe. We briefiy sketch 
it to further clarify the context we are dealing with. In Chapter 6, some further 
details on this system are introduced. 
Every year approximately 100.000 trucks belonging to the International Trans-
porters' Association (UND) of Tur key leave the country an d spread through the 
whole Europe. They reach their destinations by road through the Balkans, Cen-
trai and Western or Northern Europe. In this context, UND may be considered as 
player P. I t is o n his concern to determine the traffic fiow to be assigned to each leg 
of the network connecting the origin to the destinations. The minimization of the 
overall costs to be afforded is his main goal. In the early nineties, the sudden war 
in the former Yugoslavia caused major disruptions in the service. Then, the shipper 
had to cope with an "adverse entity" able to modify the available capacity on some 
specific links. The region involved in the confiict may be represented as a connected 
subnetwork disconnecting the origin and the destinations of the road transportation 
network since alternative road routes are not affordable. In our example, we assume 
that the shipper performs a worst-case analysis at the strategie level assuming that 
player Q wishes to maximize the costs he has to afford when going through the 
region under her control. 
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1.4 Structure of the work 
This work is organized as follows. In the next Chapter 2, to better understand 
and properly define the models later developed the necessary background on Game 
Theory is introduced in Section 2.1 and the characterization of the games we face 
is precisely stated in Section 2.2. Chapter 3 presents a literature review on the 
three relevant approaches the model developed in this work is based upon. After 
a brief overview o n the main freight transportation models in Section 3.1, models 
considering some particular games over a network are presented in Section 3.2, 
and finally in Section 3.3 a few papers dealing with bilevel linear programming 
applications o n ( freight) transportation are mentioned. The games un der study 
are mathematically formalized in the first section of Chapter 4. In addition, a 
simple explanatory network is also introduced as an example to help the reader in 
understanding the main concepts and definitions. In Section 4.2, the representation 
of both games as bilevellinear programming problems (BLPPs) is presented together 
with some undesired situations to be avoided in Section 4.3. Hence in Section 4.4 we 
provide the basic definitions and properties for a BLPP in the generai case and in 
Section 4.5 we extend these concepts to the games under consideration. In the next 
Chapter, Section 5.1 presents the definition of Nash equilibrium for such games and 
proves that the optimal solutions for a BLPP are also Nash equilibria. Following 
some theoretical background in Section 5.2, in Section 5.3 relationships of a Nash 
equilibrium point with the Minimum Cost Flow Problem are investigated. Relying 
on these results, a heuristic algorithm identifying an upper bound for the optimal 
solution of the BLPP is presented in Section 5.4. In Chapter 6, the freight traffi.c 
system motivating this work is presented in more detail. Relying on some of its 
features, a simple network is used as a test for the heuristic algorithm previously 
developed and comparisons with the results obtained from an exact procedure are 
performed. In Chapter 7 further possible research issues are presented and in the 
last Chapter some conclusions are eventually drawn. 
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Chapter 2 
Network game 
As described in the previous Section 1.1, the two entities acting on the same net-
work mutually infiuence each other, or, according to some widespread terminology, 
play a game. To better understand and properly define the models developed in 
the following sections and chapters, in Section 2.1 we introduce the necessary back-
ground o n Game Theory relying o n the two well-known reference books ( Osborne 
and Rubinstein, 1997) and (Ba§ar and Olsder, 1999). In the following Section 2.2, 
the characterization of the games we face is precisely stated. 
2.1 Game theory 
Definition l A game may be defined as a description of strategie interaction that 
include the constraints on the actions that the players can take. The individua[ 
making a decision may also be referred to as a player or a person of the game. 
Games are distinguished in different ways: 
• Noncooperative and Cooperative Games: A game is called Noncoopera-
tive if each person involved pursues his own interests which are partly confiict-
ing with others'. When the players share common interests, they cooperate in 
identifying a possible solution. 
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• Strategie (or normal) and Extensive Games: A strategie game is a model 
of a situation in which each player chooses his plan of action once and for all, 
and all players' decisions are made simultaneously (that is, when choosing a 
plan of action each player is not informed of the plan of action chosen by any 
other player). By contrast, the model of a extensive game specifies the possible 
orders of events; each player can consider his plan of action not only at the 
beginning of the game but also whenever he has to make a decision. 
• Games with Perfect and lmperfect lnformation: In the former case, the 
participants are fully informed about each others' moves, while in the latter 
case the may be imperfectly informed. 
• Finite and Infinite Games: In the former case, all the players have at their 
disposal only a finite number of alternative to choose from, while in the latter 
case at least one player has infinitely many moves. 
• Symmetrical and Hierarchical Games: In the former case, no single player 
dominates the decision process, while in the latter case one of the players has 
the ability to enforce his strategy on the other player(s). For such decision 
problems, a hierarchical equilibrium solution concept is introduced. 
In symmetrical games, an equilibrium solution of a game is reached when no one 
of the players can improve his outcome without degrading the performance of the 
other players. In particular, when the solution of a noncooperative game is such that 
one player cannot improve his outcome by altering his decision unilaterally, this is a 
N ash equilibrium solution. However, this solution in generai is not Pareto-optimal. 
In fact, if the players cooperate they could mutually benefit of a better equilibrium 
solution. 
An interesting relationship between the N ash equilibrium concept and the trans-
portation field is given by the property stating that the N ash equilibrium converges 
to the Wardrop equilibrium when the number of users becomes large. In particular, 
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Nash equilibrium is strictly related with User Equilibrium expressed by the First 
Wardrop's Principle which is often used in the context of road traffic. It has been 
shown in (Haurie and Marcotte, 1985) that the Wardrop Equilibrium is the unique 
limit of any sequence of Nash equilibria obtained for a sequence of games in which 
the number of users is finite and tends to infinity, even in those games where the 
Nash equilibrium is not unique (Altman, Ba§ar and Srikant, 1999). 
2.2 Characteristics of the game 
In this section we characterized the game we deal with. We first show that the 
presence of flow balancing constraints limits the action space of both players. In 
the following we precisely define the type of game according to the classification 
presented in Section 2.1. Finally, we introduce two different possible Stackelberg 
games the two actors can play in the framework we established. 
2.2.1 A two-player constrained game 
In this work we face a particular game because the two players are not allowed to 
act independently one to other, i.e., the constraints of each player may depend on 
the strategy of the other player (Rosen, 1965). In fact, both players have also to 
take into account the topology and the characteristics of the network they act on. 
Figure 2.1 may help to understand the context. The shipper (player P) has to ship 
a given amount of freight from node A to nodes H and I aiming at minimizing the 
cost of the transport. U nfortunately, h e has t o co p e with an adverse entity (player 
Q) who is entitled to fix the capacity of the dashed line arcs aiming at maximizing 
her utility due to the passage of the units of flow through the region she controls. 
As it is explained in Section 1.2.2, we assume that all flow from the origins to 
the destinations must go through the Q region. In this case, it is easy to prove 
that player Q action is no longer a decision on are capacities but reduces to a flow 
assignment on her region. Since connectivity is granted, the same amount of flow 
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Figure 2.1: Players P and Q acting on the same network 
entering each intermediate node (i.e., B, C, D, E, F and G) also leaves it, i.e., flow 
balancing constraints hold. For the arcs entering and leaving each of these nodes do 
not belong to the same actor ( we will call them frontier node, see Section 4. 2), the 
two players cannot freely assign the flows on the arcs they control: only assignments 
fulfilling flow balancing constraints o n each intermedia te (an d thus, frontier) n ode 
are allowed. 
By exploiting this characteristic, we identify some properties of the game solu-
tions which allow us to define a heuristic algorithm restricting its (local) search on 
the set of the Nash equilibrium points, as it is explained in Section 4.5 and in the 
following Chapter 5. 
2.2.2 Game specification 
Since players P and Q have conflicting objectives, in this work our attention is only 
focused on noncooperative games. In addition, we also assume that each player 
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has perfect information about the other player behavior. Furthermore, bot h players 
have to choose a feasible flow in the network under their own control satisfying flow 
balancing and capacity constraints, then they have infinitely many alternatives to 
consider. Due to the presence of flow balancing constraints, the game un der study 
may be referred to as a static noncooperative infinite game with coupled constraint 
sets (B~ar and Olsder, 1999). 
2.2.3 Stackelberg games 
Unfortunately, no clear interpretations of a Nash or a saddle-point equilibrium of 
the strategie form of these games stili exist (B~ar and Olsder, 1999). For this and 
other (see Section 1.2.4) reasons, the simultaneous game is explicitly not addressed 
in this p a per. Conversely, we face the situation wherein o ne of the players has the 
ability to enforce his/her decision on the other player which reacts independently and 
rationally (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1997). Hence, only the hierarchical frameworks 
(i. e., player P plays first or player Q plays first) are considered. As a consequence, we 
deal with games in their extensive form. In particular, games in which a t least o ne 
player is allowed to to act more than once and with possibly different information 
sets at each level of play, are known as multi-act games. In fact, since the shipper 
takes his strategie decisions aiming to prevent or to react to the other actor behavior, 
two different two-player infinite multi-act games can be considered: 
Game l Player P plays first. If P fixes the fiows all over the network, then no 
decision is lejt t o player Q. In fa et, Q may only adjust the are capacities according 
t o the fiows imposed by P. Such a trivial possibility is no t considered any more in the 
rest of the paper. A more realistic situation is that P plays first, initially deciding 
only on the fiows over the arcs not controlled by Q and possibly leaving unbalanced 
divergences in some nodes. Then, Q fixes the capacities of the arcs under her control 
with the only constraints that it must be possible to balance the fiows lejt unbalanced. 
Finally, P plays again deciding on the fiows in the arcs controlled by Q. 
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Game 2 Player Q plays first. This situation occurs, as an example, when a local 
traffic authority imposes the maximum fiow of trucks that the roads un der her contro l 
may bear. Given the capacities fixed by Q, then player P may decide his fiows. 
Game l is a three-stage decisi o n process. However, in Section 4. 2 we prove that 
the hypothesis about connectivity allows to remove the third level and leads to a 
two-level program. Differently, Game 2 is clearly already a two-stage process. Hence 
in this work we focus the attention on bilevel games only. In particular, we deal 
with bilevel noncooperative games in which one player ( called the leader) declares 
his strategy first and enforces i t on the other players ( called the followers) w ho 
react (rationally) to the leader's decision. Such games are referred to as Stackelberg 
games. 
In Section 4.2, we show that the payoff functions and all the constraints in both 
Stackelberg games may be expressed in a linear form. Hence these games will be 
formalized as bilevellinear programming problems (see, e.g, Bard, 1998). 
26 
Chapter 3 
Literature review 
The modelling of the two games under investigation and their characterization as 
a bilevel linear programming problems are mainly based upon three different re-
search lines. First, the players understand the freight transportation system as a 
system where the actors involved do not act simultaneously and they explicitly take 
into account the sequential nature of the interactions among them. Second, they 
play a (hierarchical) game over a fiow network which causes severe limitations and 
constraints t o their action sets. Moreover, o ne of the two players cannot be consid-
ered as a "rational" person maximizing her utility. Instead, she acts as an adverse 
player seeking to maximize inconveniences to her opposi te player. Finally, the games 
exhibit linear characteristics and can be solved using bilevellinear programming. 
All these issues have already been discussed in the scientific literature, even 
though in different separate contexts. The merging of three mentioned approaches 
in only one single framework is a major contribution of our modelling perspective. 
Furthermore, bilevel programming is rich of theoretical results and numerical algo-
rithms, but is scare in actual applications. From this point of view, the present 
work might be considered as an interesting addition to the field. In this chapter, 
a broad overview of the main available results on freight models and on the other 
two research lines with specific focus on their application to freight transportation 
is provided. 
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3.1 Freight transportation models 
In the past and recent years, passengers mobility, with particular emphasis on the 
development of modal choice and assignment models, has certainly been more widely 
investigated than freight transportation. This discrepancy might have been caused, 
on one side, by the greater complexity of the freight mobility system with respect to 
the passengers one. On the other side, the collection of reliable and detailed data is 
a highly difficult task (Camus et al., 1998). Nevertheless, "freight transportation is 
one of today's most important activities, not only as measured by the yardstick of 
its own share of a nation's gross national product (GNP), but also by the increasing 
infiuence that transportation and distribution of goods have on the performance 
of virtually all other economie sectors" ( Crainic an d La porte, 1997). To suitably 
face the new theoretical challenges and effectively meet the operator requirements, 
in the recent years more attention is paid to the freight transportation system by 
the academic community and practitioners. For instance, new International Jour-
nals ( e.g., Transportation Research, P art E: Logistics), Special Issues of scientific 
Journals, Workshops ( e.g., Odysseus: Logistics and Freight Transportation, to be 
held triennially) an d Conference streams completely devoted on logistics an d freight 
transportation problems are increasing every year. This interest together with the 
availability of more performing computers leads to the development of more power-
ful algorithms thus providing more realistic models both in terms of complexity and 
size. In this section, we briefiy describe the principal methodological approaches for 
modelling freight transportation systems that have been useful in developing this 
work. 
3.1.1 Equilibrium models 
They represent the modal choice and assignment of a freight transportation system 
in an aggregate way: interactions among the different decision makers are not explic-
itly taken into account. lnstead, fiow ( tons or trucks) on the multimodal network are 
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represented considering the demand expressed in terms of the O /D matrices. The 
representation of the infrastructural network is performed with particular care: the 
aim is to differentiate by means of appropriate cost functions either the actual net-
work arcs from those representing intermodal exchanges, either the arcs related to 
the different nodes of transport. A seminai model following the described approach is 
the Harvard- Brookings model (Kresge and Roberts, 1971). Later contributions are 
the Freight Network Equilibrium Model (Harker and Friesz, 1986) which introduces 
the congestion phenomenon and the Multimode Multiproduct Network Assignment 
Model ( Guélat, Florian and Crainic, 1990) which allows to obtain a description of 
the multimodal transport system able to support decisions at the strategie level. 
These network models provide a clear description of the system but, as a drawback, 
they lack in accuracy with respect to the decisional process occurring in the system. 
In addition, they do not consider some typical aspects of a freight transportation 
system as the back-hauling phenomenon and the limitations on the availability of 
vehicles. However, they provi de an analytical approach for representing the trans-
portation costs of the network. 
3.1.2 Sequential models 
Due to the widespread fragmentation in both the demand and supply sides, different 
actors are generally involved in the freight transportation system. The sequential 
models explicitly describe the decision making process for both sides. Unlike pas-
sengers mobility, these decisions have usually more infiuence on the actual behavior 
of a freight transportation system rather than the determination of the minimum 
generalized transportation cost only. The operators involved may be usually clas-
sified in four families: Producers and Consumers (transportation demand), Public 
Authorities (Local entities, Port Authorities, Governments), Shippers and Carriers. 
Each of them deals with problems which are mutually interconnected a t the different 
hierarchical levels, i.e., a t the strategie, tactical, and operationallevel. As a rough 
29 
approximation, the main features of the decision making process may be adequately 
represented by considering the role of shippers and carriers only. In fact, produc-
ers, consumers and Public Authorities affect the system in a less dynamic way and 
their influences may be taken into account by means of constraints imposed on the 
shippers and the carriers (Camus et al., 1998). The transportation demand usually 
can be adequately expressed in terms of O /D matrices, whereas public authorities' 
activity mainly affects the design of the infrastructure supply and/ or the link cost 
functions of the multimodal network. On the other hand, shippers and carriers may 
act, at different levels, on several decision making variables, and influence the final 
structure of the system. Relationships among all the actors involved in the transport 
of goods are conceptually described, e.g., in the framework proposed by Harker an d 
Friesz, 1986. However, the other existing models generally take into account only 
the decision making process between shippers and carriers. 
Among the most interesting models, the approach proposed by Friesz, Gottfried 
and Morlok (1986) assumes a merely sequential structure to describe the hierarchical 
decision process and proposes a nonlinear optimization model to represent it. At 
the beginning, shippers, on the basis of aggregate information about the network 
and the transport demand in terms of production and needs, decide origins and 
destinations of the movements, transport modes and, if any, nodes of intermodal 
exchange aiming at minimizing their own total generalized cost. In the following, 
a correspondence between the nodes of the aggregate (shipper's) and the detailed 
( carrier's) networks is established. Then each carrier receives from the shippers 
fixed amounts of demand and optimizes its own transport subsystem in order to 
minimize the generalized cost o n this su bnetwork. In particular, carriers may decide 
on the path to be followed on the detailed network and on other operative issues as, 
e.g., fleet and crew rostering and scheduling. A t the end of this two-stage decision 
process, are and path flows and costs are obtained. Criticism is raised to this model 
because of the lack of interaction between the two hierarchical levels, namely, by no 
means carriers' choices are allowed to influence shippers' decisions. In particular, 
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shippers are not able to evaluate the actual cost in the different arcs because it 
depends o n the load alloca t ed by the lower level decisi o n maker. Thus this is no t 
an equilibrium model allowing shippers and carriers to take simultaneous decisions. 
3.1.3 Mathematical programming models 
Mathematical programming models and algorithms have proved highly suitable for 
the solution of road freight transportation problems at the strategie, tactical and 
operational levels. They use linear, integer or mixed integer programming method-
ologies both in a static and dynamic context on a deterministic or stochastic net-
work. When the exact solution can not be obtained in due time because of the 
computational N P-hardness of the problems, approximate or heuristic algorithms 
are also developed and implemented. Restricting the attention to the strategie level 
only, goods producing firms are mainly concerned on the distribution network de-
sign problem whereas transportation or logistics firms focus their attention on the 
transportation network design problem (Speranza, 1999). In the former case, the 
decision maker has to decide on the node characteristics (i.e., plant facilities, centrai 
or regional warehouses, intersshipment points), on their amount, location and capac-
ity, on the distribution routes, and on the transportation modality for each possible 
link. Cost minimization while satisfying a given level of service for customers is his 
main objective. In the latter case, the aim is to choose links in a network, along 
with capacities, eventually, i~ order to enable goods to flow between origin and des-
tination at the lowest possible system cost, i.e., the total fixed cost of selecting the 
links plus the total variables cost of using the network (Crainic and Laporte, 1997). 
A wide range of different problems on these topics exists according to the con-
straints the system under study is subject to and the objectives of the decision 
maker. More complex challenges arise when integrating the strategie and the tacti-
callevels, e.g., simultaneously considering the just above described aspects with the 
collection and/ or distribution routing and scheduling issues. 
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3.2 Network Game models 
When a network with non-cooperating agents acting on it is considered, the game 
theoretic approach may be relevant. Indeed, the search for Nash or Stackelberg equi-
libria has been employed in, e.g., fiow control, routing and virtual-path bandwidth 
allocation in modern networking (Libman and Orda, 1999). In this context, models 
dealing with very simple topologies (i.e., a common source and a common desti-
nation n ode interconnected by a number of parallel links) an d considering either a 
single follower and a multi follower Stackelberg game have been presented (Korilis, 
Lazar and Orda, 1997). They propose a method for architecting noncooperative 
equilibria in the run time phase, i.e., during the actual operation of the network. 
This approach is based in the observation that, apart from the fiow generateci by the 
self-optimizing users, typically, there is also some network fiow that is controlled by 
a centrai entity, also called "the manager". As an example, we might consider the 
traffic generateci by signalling and/ or control mechanisms, as well ad traffic of users 
that belong to virtual network. The manager attempts to optimize the system per-
formance, through the control of its portion of fiow. This framework is generally not 
suitable for transportation networks because in this latter case the user controls just 
an infinitesimally small portion ofthe network fiow (i.e., a car on the road), whereas 
we are concerned with users controlling non negligible portions of fiow (Orda, Rom 
and Shimkin, 1993). However, it provides complementary aspects with the freight 
transportation network we propose in this work. On one side, it considers a simpler 
network topology (i. e., only parallel arcs) than we do. On the other side, i t assumes 
that the leader and follower may control portions of the fiow in a given are, whereas 
we always imagine t ha t in each are all the fiow is fully controlled by only o ne player. 
As a further research, it would be interesting to investigate more thoroughly the 
links between these two approaches. 
The game theoretic approach is explicitly used in a transport network by Bell 
(1999) and Bell (2000). In these papers, the author envisages a two-player, non-
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cooperative, zero sum game between a network user seeking to a path to minimize the 
expected trip cost on one hand and an "an evil entity" imposing link costs on the user 
so as to maximize the expected trip cost on the other. The user guesses what link 
costs will be imposed and the evil entity guesses which path will be chosen. At the 
N ash mixed strategy equilibrium, the user is unable to reduce the expected trip cost 
by changing its path choice probabilities while the evil entity is unable to increase the 
expected trip cost by changing the scenario probabilities, without cooperating. At 
the equilibrium, this game offers a useful measure of network reliability defined as the 
expected trip costs that are acceptable even when users are extremely pessimistic 
about the state of the network. These papers differ from our approach because 
they considera simultaneous game with mixed strategies. In addition, the network 
user seeks to solve a shortest path problem, whereas we face a minimum cost fiow 
problem. However, they introduce the concept of an "evil entity" operating on 
a network to be dealt with by the user. This provides the theoretical framework 
for performing a worst-case analysis as a basis for a cautious approach to network 
design. 
Even though the game theoretic approach is not explicitly addressed, another 
similar network game to be considered has been introduced by Lozovanu and Trubin, 
1994. They present a different two-player game over a network. In their model, a 
partition of the network nodes in two classes is considered. The player controlling 
the first ( second) class chooses the arcs in or der t o maximize ( minimize) the sum 
of their costs. The game consists of a sequence of moves that incrementally build 
the solution path. Each player moves (i.e., includes new arcs in the path under 
construction) if an d only if the are t o be chosen t o reach destination belongs t o 
his/her own class. It follows that at each node it is possible to identify the maximin 
or the minimax path from a given origin, according to the class the node belongs to. 
In contrast to this incrementa! approach, in our system each player assigns fiows at 
a given time or, respectively, capacities to all the arcs under his/her own control. 
Note that the game is not necessarily simultaneous in the sense that the two players 
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may or may not make their move at the same time. Each actor decides at the same 
time for all his/her arcs, but each move is taken, in generai, at a different time. 
3.3 Bilevel models 
In generai, bilevel programming problems are difficult to sol ve because of their inher-
ent non-convexity and non-differentiability (Florian and Chen, 1995). Due to their 
NP-hard nature, practitioners are committed in developing new exact or heuris-
tic algorithms ab le to identify a ( acceptable) solution in not too long computation 
time. In spite of the substantial development of research in this area, there is stili 
scope for improvement. Bard (1998) provides a recent and updated summary of the 
theoretical results and introduces the most widespread solution techniques for the 
linear, non linear and generai case, respectively. This book is used as a reference 
throughout this work whenever bilevel programming issues are concerned. 
Among the different applications, some transport studies have been performed 
using bilevel models. In particular, they mainly focus on passengers' mobility with 
emphasis on the road transport sector. The early papers deal with highway network 
system design (see, e.g., Ben-Ayed, Boyce and Blair, 1988) also considering conges-
tion effects (Marcotte, 1986). Traffic control models, like, e.g., traffic signal setting, 
optimal road capacity improvement, estimation of the origin-destination matrices 
from traffic counts, ramp metering in freeway-arterial corridor and optimization of 
road tolls have also been developed using bilevel programming technique (Yang and 
BeH, 2001). Recent advances in this field rely on non-traditional formulations of 
static and dynamic equilibrium network design and on the development of algo-
rithms for urban traffic optimization models (again, Yang and BeH, 2001). 
Even though bilevel programming enables the representation of competition be-
tween players, hardly ever freight transportation modelling relies on this technique. 
A relevant exception to this trend is the paper written by Brotcorne et al., 2000. 
They develop a bilevel programming formulation for freight transportation focusing 
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the attention to a tariff-setting problem involving two decision makers acting non-
cooperatively and in a sequential way. The leader consists in one among a group 
of competing carriers and the follower is a shipper. At the upper level, a given 
carrier maximizes its revenues by setting optimal tariff on the subset of arcs under 
its control. On one side, the reaction from its competitors is neglected, on the other 
side, the reaction of the shipper company to its price schedule is explicitly taken 
into account. A shipper company (the follower) ships a prescribed amount of goods 
from origins to its customers at minimum cast. The lower level problem provides 
the fiow repartition solving a standard transshipment problem where the tariffs are 
added to the initial are costs. Supply at the origin nodes and demand from the 
customers are both assumed to be known and fixed. Hence the shipper minimizes 
its transportation costs, given the tariff schedule set by the leader. 
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Chapter 4 
Mathematical formulation 
Games l an d 2 are mathematically formalized in the first sections of this chapter. 
In addition, a simple explanatory network is also introduced as an example to help 
the reader in understanding the main concepts and definitions. In Section 4.2, we 
claim that both games may be represented as bilevellinear programming problems 
(BLPPs). Hence in Section 4.4 we provide the basic definitions and properties for a 
BLPP in the generai case and in Section 4.5 we extend these concepts to the games 
under consideration. 
4.1 N otation an d definitions 
Given a digraph G = (N, A), where N is the set of nodes and A is the set of arcs, 
each node i E N is either a source node or a sink node or simply a transshipment 
node. A fiow divergence vector b is given, with bi > O if i is a source node, bi < O 
if i is a sink node, and bi = O if i is a transshipment node. The arcset A in G 
is partitioned in two subsets, A = AP U AQ, with BP and BQ the corresponding 
incidence matrices. The cardinalities of sets AP and AQ are defined as p and q, 
respectively. Each are a E A has an upper bound ila on the maximum fiow that can 
pass through it. All the lower bounds are assumed equal to zero. 
Player P decides the values of the fiows through the arcs in AP necessary to 
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satisfy the demand expressed by the divergence vector b. Player Q decides the 
values of the capacities of the arcs in AQ, i. e., she may reduce the upper bound ile of 
any are e down to a lower value Ua. Define x E RP the vector of the flows of the arcs 
in AP and y E Rq the vector of the flows of the arcs in AQ. The two players have, 
possibly different, objectives cpP =cPP x+ cPQY and cpQ = cQP x+ cQQy, respectively. 
We assume that all the components of cpP and cpQ are constant and non negative. 
A simple example (see Fig. 4.1) may help to better understand the network and 
the notation just introduced. 
1 ; 3 
----
1 ; o 
' 
l 
' 
l 
' l > 10. 51 ' 10. 7 
' ' ' 
l ' 1 ; o l 1 ; o 
----
2;4 
Figure 4.1: Players P and Q network 
Player P controls the solid line arcs and player Q the dashed line ones. Thus 
the arcset A= AP U AQ is composed of 
AP = {AB,AC,DF,EF} and AQ = {BD,BE,CD,CE}. 
In Tab. 4.1 the costs and the capacities associateci to each are a E A are shown: 
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a cPP CPQ CQP CQQ Ua 
AB l - o - l 
AC l - o - l 
BD - l - 3 l 
BE - lO - 5 l 
CD - lO - 7 l 
CE - 2 - 4 l 
DF l - o - 2 
EF l - o - 2 
Table 4.1: Are eosts and eapaeities 
We finally assume that 2 units of flow leave souree A and have to reaeh destina-
tion F, i.e., bA= 2,bB =be= bn =bE= O,bp = -2. 
4.2 Game formulations 
Aeeording to the above notation, Game l claims that given two players, P and Q, 
and a network G = (N, A), the first player P decides the values of the flows x, then 
player Q deeides the values of the eapaeities uQ, finally player P deeides the values of 
the flows y. We may observe that both the payoff funetions and all the eonstraints, 
i.e., flow balaneing, eapaeity an d nonnegative eonstraints, are linear. Henee this is 
a linear three-stage game whieh may be formalized as follows: 
minc/JP = 
x 
cpp x+ CPQY (la) 
BPx = bP (l b) 
subjeet to max c/JQ = CQP X+ CQQY 
UQ 
(le) 
mincPQY 
y 
(ld) 
BQy = bQ (le) 
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BPQ x + BQP y = o 
o~ x~ ilp 
0 ~ y ~ uQ ~ ilQ 
(lf) 
(lg) 
(lh) 
where (la) is the objective of player P, (le) is the objective of player Q, (ld) is the 
second move of player P and conditions (lb), (le) and (lf) are the flow balancing 
constraints for nodes in which only arcs in AP are incident, nodes in which only 
arcs in AQ are incident, and nodes in which arcs both in AP and AQ are incident, 
respectively. In the following, these last nodes are referred to as frontier nodes. 
Denote N C N the set of the frontier nodes. As an example, referring again to Fig. 
4.1, N = { B, C, D, E}. W e also define BPQ as the incidence matrix for frontier no d es 
corresponding to arcs in AP and BQP as the incidence matrix for the frontier nodes 
corresponding to arcs in A Q. Note t ha t t h ere is no loss of generality in assuming 
that no sink or source can be a frontier node. 
Theorem l When network GQ = (N, AQ) disconnects network GP = (N, AP), 
letting player Q choose the capacities uQ corresponds to make her define the fiows 
y over the subnetwork GQ = (N, AQ), provided that the fiow balancing constraints 
with fiows x are met. 
Proof: Each are in GQ has a maximum capacity il Q. Player Q would lower these 
capacities to let pass as much flow as possible in the more profitable arcs and as less 
flow as possible in the less profitable arcs. In this way, she fixes the exact amount of 
flow going through each are, i.e., she assigns the flow on her network. Hence player 
P does not have any further room to decides on the flows y, i.e., equation (ld) may 
be removed. On the contrary, this equation stili holds when some flow can reach 
destination by overcoming GQ. In this case, once player Q has fixed the capaciti es 
on her arcs, player P is allowed to assign to GQ less flow than the available capacity 
by sending some flow over the arcs not passing through i t. D 
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Under the above hypotheses, Game l simplifies: first P decides flows x, then 
Q decides flows y. Model (l) describing Game l may be restated as the following 
bilevel linear programming problem, or linear Stackelberg game (see, e.g., Bard, 
1998), since player P cannot do anything different from giving up the control of 
flows y to player Q: 
min<J>P = cPP x+ cPQY 
x 
subject to max <PQ = cQP x+ cQQY 
y 
BPx = bP 
BQy = bQ 
BPQX + BQPY =o 
o~ x~ uP 
0 ~ y ~ uQ. 
(2a) 
(2b) 
(2c) 
(2d) 
(2e) 
(2f) 
(2g) 
Similarly, Game 2 where, given two players P and Q, and a network G =(N, A), 
player Q decides first, may be formally stated by means of BLPP (2) with the only 
difference that the role of the two objective functions (2a) and (2b) are exchanged. 
By means of the example previously introduced in Fig. 4.1, we present the three 
different possibilities that the shipper (i.e., player P) may face when deciding to 
move two units of flow from source A to destination F and solving BLPP (2). 
• Player P plays first (Game l). In this case, player P has only three choices 
for allocating the two units of flow (see Tab. 4.2). Player Q reacts to each of 
them in such a way to maximize her profit. Observe that when P considers 
the second alternative, Q may react in two ways: YBD = l, YBE = O, YcD = 
O, YcE = l yielding <PQ = 7 or YBD = O, YBE = l, YcD = l, YcE = O yielding 
<PQ = 12. Obviously, she will choose the latter one. Since this behavior is 
known by player P, he will finally choose the third alternative that leads to 
a minimization of his costs, i.e., XAB = l, XAc = l, XDF = 2, YEF = O and 
<PP = 15 (Fig. 4.2a). 
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Player P choices Player Q consequent choice 
AB AC DF EF BD BE CD CE maxcpQ cpp 
l l o 2 o l o l 11 16 
l l l l o l l o 12 24 
l l 2 o l o l o 8 15 
Table 4. 2: Player P plays first 
• Player Q plays first (Game 2). In this case, player Q has four different 
possible moves and player P may react to each of them in only a single way 
(see, Tab. 4.3). It is easy to show that the third alternative is the optimal 
solution in this game (Fig. 4. 2b) an d cpP = 24. 
Player Q choices Player P consequent choice 
BD BE CD CE AB AC DF EF mincpP cpQ 
l o l o l l 2 o 15 8 
l o o l l l l l 7 7 
o l l o l l l l 24 12 
o l o l l l o 2 16 11 
Table 4.3: Player Q plays first 
• Player Q does not exist. This situation is presented only to compare the 
two previous games with the most favorable case the shipper may afford: he 
fully controls all the arcs of the graph. Thus he has simply to sol ve a Minimum 
Flow Cast Problem over the entire network (Fig. 4.2c). The result turns out 
to be cpP = 7 which is the smallest value among the three possible alternatives, 
as it should have been expected. 
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a b 
c 
Figure 4.2: The three alternatives the shipper may face 
However, in the remainder of this work we always consider Game l under the 
hypotheses defining BLPP (2). 
Comparison with another network game 
To further clarify the games under study, we compare player P's results when he 
moves first with the assignment obtained when the players moves in accordance 
with the game proposed by Lozovanu and Trubin (1994) which has already been 
introduced in Section 3.2. Also in this latter case, player P aims at minimizing the 
cost of the transport and player Q aims at maximizing her utility. Conversely to 
our approach, each player do es not act o n all the arcs un der his /her control a t the 
same time. Starting from the origin, player P assigns the flow on the first part of his 
network, then he waits for player Q's choice on her subgraph and, finally, he makes 
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the assignment on his remaining arcs thus reaching destination. Always relying on 
the simple network introduced in Fig. 4.1, it is easy to show that the outcome of 
this game is depicted in Fig. 4.2b. Even though he moves first, player P gets a 
worse payoff (than the result shown in Fig. 4.2a representing Game l) because he 
is not able to completely prevent the other player's reaction as he normally does in 
Game l. 
4.3 Undesired situations 
Undesired situations may occur and have to be avoided. 
l. Player Q does not have to force circulations in the flow. In fact, player P 
would never play against player Q if he knew that she could force his vehicles 
to indefinitely loop in the region under her control. To prevent this situation, i t 
is assumed that either GQ is cycle-free or that in (2) the appropriate constraints 
preventing flow circulation, possibly exponential in number, are added. In this 
latter case, the algorithm we later present may stili be used, but the solution 
of the maximum cost flow problem in one of its steps would become a NP-hard 
problem. 
2. When multiple optima for player Q leading to different values of cPQY exist, 
player P may not achieve his optimal solution even though the feasible region of 
BLPP (2) is not empty. To overcome this problem, observe that once player Q 
has reached optimality, she is no longer in competition with player P. Hence, 
we assume a benevolent (cooperative) attitude of player Q with respect to 
player P. Then, the two players may collaborate and player P may encourage 
player Q to choose a desirable solution for him. This framework allows player 
P to always identify an optimal solution, as described in Bialas and Karwan, 
1984. As an example, consider Fig. 4.3 which is a slight modification of 
the network introduced in Fig. 4.1. In this network, player Q always earns 
43 
1 ; 1 
----
1 ; o \ l \ l 
\ l 
> 10"11 \ 10"1 
l \ l 
l \ 
1 ; o l 1 ; o 
----
2; 1 
Figure 4.3: Player Q has multiple optima 
4. Since she would choose the most favorable alternative t o player P, i.e., 
YBD = l, YBE = O, YcD = O, YcE = l, he would play XAB = l, XAc = l, XDF = 
l, XEF = l leading to cpP = 7. 
4.4 Bilevel linear programming 
In the previous section, we claim that the game under investigation is formalized as 
a bilevellinear programming problem (BLPP). To solve it, some basic background 
has to be introduced. Relying on (Bard, 1998), i t is first given for the generai case. 
Then its adaptation to BLPP (2) is provided in Section 4.5. 
A generai BLPP for continuous variable can be written as follows: 
minF(x, y) 
x EX 
subject to A1x + B1y ~ b1 
min f(x, y) = c2x + d2y 
yEY 
subject to A2x + B2y ~ b2 
where x E X C Rn, y E Y C Rm, F : X x Y --+ R, and f : X x Y --+ R. 
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In addition, cl, C2 E Rn, dl, d2 E Rm, bl E RP, b2 E Rq, Al E Rpxn, Bl E Rpxm, 
A2 E Rqxn, B2 E Rqxm. Once the leader selects an x, the first term in the follower's 
objective function becomes a constant and can be removed from the problem. Hence 
y can be viewed as a function of x, i.e., y = y(x). 
Fora BLPP the following definitions are introduced: 
l. Constraint region of the BLPP: 
2. Feasible set for the follower for each fixed x E X: 
3. Projection of S onta the leader's decision space: 
4. Follower's ration reaction set for x E S(X): 
P(x) = {y E Y: y E argmin[f(x, y): y E S(x)]} 
5. Inducible region: 
IR = {(x,y): (x,y) E S,y E P(x)} 
To ensure that the BLPP is well posed it is common to assume that S is nonempty 
and compact, and that for decisions taken by the leader, the follower has some room 
to respond, i.e., P(x) =/= 0. The rational reaction set P(x) defines the response while 
the inducible region I R represents the set aver which the leader may optimize. Thus 
in terms of the above notation, the BLPP can be written as: 
min {F(x, y) : (x, y) E I R} . 
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Unlike linear programming, the identification of the optimal solution fora BLPP 
is generally a very hard task. More formally, it has been proved that the BLPP 
is strongly NP-hard. Thus the need for heuristics or approximate algorithms for 
finding a solution of good quality in acceptable time. However, some properties of 
the optimal solution of a BLPP are known: 
Property l Unless the follower's terms in F and f are collinear (i. e., d1 = ad2 , a> 
O) there is no assurance that the optimal solution t o the BLP P will be Pareto opti mal. 
Property 2 The inducible region can be written equivalently as a piecewise linear 
equality constraint comprised of supporting hyperplanes of S. 
Property 3 An optimal solution to BLPP occurs at a vertex of I R. 
Property 4 An optimal solution to BLPP occurs at a vertex of S. 
The meaning of the above definitions and properties are geometrically clarified 
and explained considering the following BLPP: 
9 
max -x+ -y 
x 2 
s. t. miny 
y 
x+y~2 
-x+ y ~l 
x+ 2y::;; 14 
2x- y::;; 8 
x,y ~O 
Fig. 4.4 depicts this BLPP. The constraint region S is the light gray region. For a 
given point x1 in the projection set S(X), the feasible set S(x1) and the reaction 
set P(x1) are given. The thick solid line represents the inducible region I R. In this 
specific case Property l holds. In fact, the optimal solution P* is dominateci by all 
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the other points in the region delimitated by the hyperplanes y = 4, -x+(9/2)y = 12 
and -x+ y = l. Finally, it is easy to see that Properties 2 - 4 are fulfilled. 
S(X) 
Figure 4.4: Bilevellinear programming problem 
4.5 Inducible regions 
According to Property 3, the optimal solution lies on a vertex of the inducible region. 
This is the leader's inducible region, of course. However, if we assume to exchange 
the role of the players, a follower's inducible region may be similarly defined. As 
it will be shown in the next Chapter 5, for solving BLPP (2) the inducible regions 
of both players are required. In this section, we define them and we show that 
due to the presence of the frontier nodes or, otherwise stared, due to the fact that 
the subnetwork GQ disconnects sources and destinations, the inducible region may 
be easily determined by solving a Minimum and a Maximum Cost Flow Problem, 
respecti vely. 
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Definition 2 Given a network G = (N, A) where constraints {2c)- {2g) hold, de fine 
as frontier flow vector any vector"" E ~INI such that BPQx ="" and BQPY = -K,. 
Note that the component ""i of vector ""is nothing else than the flow passing form 
the subnetwork QP to the subnetwork GQ through the frontier node i. For this 
reason the vectors "" are referred to as frontier fiow vectors. As an example, in 
Fig. 4.2a the frontier vector is "" = (-l, -l, 2, O) and in both Fig. 4.2b and 4.2c is 
""= (-1, -1, l, 1). 
Definition 3 For any frontier fiow vector ""' define 
According to these definitions, the following theorem trivially holds: 
Theorem 2 Ifa point (x, y) is feasible for constraints (2c) - (2g), then it exists a 
frontier fiow vector "' such that x E Xk and y E yk. Conversely, if a frontier fiow 
vector"" exists such that both Xk and yk are non empty, then any point (x,y) where 
x E Xk and y E yk is a feasible solution for BLPP {2). 
By extending the definitions introduced in Section 4.4 and closely parallelling the 
arguments in Section 4.3 in Ba§ar and Olsder (1999), i t is now possible to define the 
leader's and follower's rational reaction sets and inducible regions. 
Definition 4 Given BLPP (2), let exist a frontier fiow vector"" such that both Xk 
and yk are non empty. Since the minimum of cpP(x, y) with respect to x E Xk ~s 
attained for each y E yk, the set RP (y) C Xk defined by 
is called the optimal response or rational reaction set of player P. The set 
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is called the inducible region ofplayerQ. Likewise, RQ(x) = {(E yk: c/JQ(x,() 2:: 
cpQ(x,y)\ly E Yk} and JRP = {(x,y): x E Xk,y E RQ(x)} are, respectively, the 
rational reaction set of player Q and the inducible region of player P. 
According to this definition, in BLPP (2), being the flows "" fixed, RP(y) is deter-
mined solving a Minimum Cost Flow Problem. Similarly, RQ (x) is the solution of a 
Maximum Cost Flow Problem. Hence the following theorem holds: 
Theorem 3 RP(y) and RQ(x) depend only on the frontier fiow vector ""' i.e., 
RQ(x) = JQ(""), \lx E Xk, and RP(y) = jP(~), \ly E Yk, where jP and JQ solve a 
minimum and maximum cost fiow problem, respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
The optimal solution 
The optimal solution of any BLPP lies on a vertex of the leader's inducible region. 
Since in this work we always referto Game l where player P plays first, the optimal 
solution of BLPP (2) lies on a vertex of the shipper's inducible region. In Section 
4.5, we state that for any feasible frontier fiow ""' the shipper's and follower's rational 
reaction sets are easily determined by solving a Maximum and Minimum Cost Flow 
Problem, respectively. Relying on this result, we now develop an algorithm which 
allows to move from a starting point of the shipper's inducible region to another point 
in the shipper's inducible region always providing a better solution for him. When 
no further "better" points may be attained, the algorithm stops. U nfortunately, 
only a local optimum is identified. 
The rationale behind the algorithm stems from the consideration that the op-
timal solution for BLPP (2) is also a Nash equilibrium point for BLPP (2). In 
particular, the algorithm moves from a Nash equilibrium point for BLPP (2) to an-
other "better" Nash equilibrium point. Section 5.1 presents the definition of Nash 
equilibrium for BLPP (2) and proves that the optimal solutions are Nash equilibria. 
The identification of such equilibria relies on the Negative Cycle Optimality Con-
ditions for solving a Minimum Cost Flow Problem. Section 5.2, entirely based on 
Ahuja, Magnati and Orlin (1993) provides the relevant definitions and theorems for 
introducing such conditions in the generai case. Section 5.3 extends these defini-
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tions and theorems to the two-players network under study and links them to the 
Nash equilibrium point of BLPP (2). Finally, Section 5.4 introduces the local search 
algorithm. 
5.1 Equilibrium points 
In this section, we introduce the concept of Nash equilibrium point for BLPP (2) 
and we prove that any optimal solution for BLPP (2) is also a Nash equilibrium 
point. 
Given a leader's choice x, the follower's rational reaction set represents the best 
value(s) that can be attained by her for that specific move x. Likewise, given a 
follower's choice y, the leader's rational reaction set represents the best value(s) 
that can be attained by him for that specific move y. It follows that none of the 
players can improve his (her) outcome without degrading the performance of the 
other player if and only if their choice (x, y) lies on both reaction sets, i.e., we may 
state the following definition (see Ba§ar and Olsder, 1999): 
Definition 5 A feasible point (x, y) which belongs t o both the inducible regions I RP 
and IRQ is called a Nash Equilibrium Point for BLPP (2), i. e., the Nash Equilibria 
Set (NES) is formally defined as: 
As a counterexample, consider the frontier vector "" = (1, l, -l, -l). The vector 
x= {xAB = l,xAc = l,xDF = l,XEF =l} and y = {YBD = l,YBE = O,YcD = 
O, YcE = l} is a feasible solution and belongs to I RP, but y is not a point of player 
Q rational reaction. This is clearly no t a N ash equilibrium because player Q can 
improve her outcome (moving to her rational reaction point y = {YBD = O, YBE = 
l, YcD = l, YcE =O}) without degrading the shipper's choice. 
Theorem 4 A feasible point (x'", y"') where x"'= arg min cPP x and y"' = arg max cQQY 
xEXk yEYk 
is a N ash equilibrium point. 
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Proof Just check that x,. E RP(y) and y,. E RQ(x) . D 
Hence from Theorem 3 and given a feasible frontier vector ~, a Nash equilib-
rium point is obtained by solving a minimum and a maximum cost flow problem, 
respectively. 
We may now characterize the optimal solution of BLPP (2). First, we prove the 
existence of the optimal solution. Then, we show that i t is also a N ash equilibrium 
point. 
Theorem 5 If BLPP {2) has feasible solutions, it always admits an optimal solu-
tion. 
Proof If conditions (2c) - (2g) define a nonempty set, this is a compact set and 
RQ(x) =/= 0. If RQ(x) is a singleton, BLPP (2) is well posed and admits optimal 
solution (cf., e.g., Bard, 1998). If RQ(x) is not single-valued and holding the cooper-
ative attitude of player Q assumption, the unique optimal solution for the player P 
may be achieved by means of incentive schemes as described in Bialas and Karwan 
(1984). D 
Theorem 6 An optimal solution far BLPP (2) is a Nash equilibrium point. 
Proof Let (x*, y*) be an optimal solution for BLPP (2) and ~* the corresponding 
frontier flow vector. On on side, since player P plays first, (x*, y*) certainly be-
longs to IRQ. On the other side, we prove that (x*,y*) belongs also to JRP, i.e., 
cj?(x*, y*) ~ cj?(x, y*) for any feasible x given y* (i.e., V x E Xk*). By contradiction, 
let x E Xk* be such that cj?(x,y*) < cj?(x*,y*). It follows that cPP x< cPP x*. Since 
(x*, y*) is an optimal solution of BLPP (2), 
Hence RQ(x*) < RQ(x). But Theorem 3 contradicts this result. D 
A N ash equilibrium point is always referred to as the solution of a simultaneous 
game (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1997). Conversely, a Stackelberg equilib-
rium point is the solution of a sequential game. Theorem 6 states that the optimal 
52 
solution of the BLPP (2) (a sequential game) may also be obtained as an outcome 
of a simultaneous game (which is a completely different situation, of course). Thus 
we could conclude that it would be sufficient to play a simultaneous game to solve 
BLPP (2), as well. This would be a very attractive result because the simultaneous 
game may be solved simply by means of minimum and maximum cost fiow prob-
lems, as proved earlier. Unfortunately, this is not true. In fact, when a simultaneous 
game is played, many different Nash equilibria may exist. But a-priori we do not 
h ave any evidence that bot h players would meet exactly a t the N ash equilibrium 
which is also the Stackelberg one. And, if they reach a Nash point that is not a 
Stackelberg one they do not have any reason to move apart from there. Hence the 
importance of Theorem 6: BLPPs are NP-hard problems, but this theorem allows 
to restrict the search for the optimal solution in the Nash Equilibria Set (N ES) 
only. The algorithm introduced in the last section of this chapter performs a local 
search in this N ES. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 provide the theoretical framework required 
to correctly define this algorithm. 
5.2 Residua! network 
This section introduces the Negative Cycle Optimality Conditions for solving a Min-
imum Cost Flow Problem (MCFP) in the general case. 
Let G = (N, A) be a directed network with a cost Cij and a capacity uij associateci 
with every are (i, j) E A. We associate with each node i E N a number b(i) which 
indicates its supply or demand depending on whether b( i) > O or b( i) < O. The 
minimum cost fiow problem can be stated as follows: 
min z(x) 
subject to 
L CijXij 
(i,j)EA 
~ X"- ~ X··-b(i) ViEN 6 'tJ 6 J't-
{j:(i,j)EA} {j:(j,i)EA} 
o:::; Xij :::; Uij V(i,j) E A 
We further make the following assumptions: 
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l. All data ( cost, supply / demand, an d capacity) are integrai; 
2. The network is directed; 
3. The supplies/demands at the nodes satisfy the condition LiEN b(i) = O and 
the minimum cost flow problem has a feasible solution; 
4. All are costs are nonnegative. 
Definition 6 The residual network G(x) corresponding to a fiow x is defined as 
follows. We replace each are (i,j) E A by two arcs (i,j) and (j,i). The are (i,j) 
has cast cij and the residual capacity rij = Uij - Xij, and the are (j, i) has cast 
c1i = -cij and residual capacity r1i = Xij. The residual network consists only of arcs 
with positive residual capacity. 
Definition 7 A cycle W (not necessarily directed) in G is called an augmenting 
cycle with respect to the fiow x if by augmenting a positive amount of fiow f(W) 
around the cycle, the fiow remains feasible. 
In terms of residual networks, each augmenting cycle W with respect to a flow x 
corresponds t o a directed cycle W in G (x), an d vice versa. 
Theorem 7 Augmenting Cycle Theorem. Let x and X0 be any two feasible 
solutions of a network fiow problem. Then x equals. X0 plus the fiow on at most m 
directed cycles in G(x0 ). Furthermore, the cast of x equals the cost of X0 plus the 
cast of fiow on these augmenting cycles. 
Theorem 8 Negative Cycle Optimality Conditions. A feasible solution x* is 
an optimal solution of the minimum cast fiow problem if and only if it satisfies the 
negative cycle optimality conditions: namely, the residual network G(x*) contains 
no negative cast ( directed) cycle. 
Proof: Suppose that x is a feasible flow and that G(x) contains a negative cycle. 
Then x cannot be an optimal flow, since by augmenting positive flow along the cycle 
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we can improve the objective function value. Therefore, if x* is an optimal fiow, 
then G(x*) cannot contain a negative cycle. Now suppose that x* is a feasible fiow 
and t ha t G (x*) contains no negative cycle. Let X0 be an optimal fiow an d X0 =/= x*. 
The augmenting cycle property shows that we can decompose the difference vector 
X0 - x* into at most m augmenting cycles with respect to the fiow x* and the sum 
of the costs of fiows on these cycles equals ex0 - ex* ~ O, or ex0 ~ ex*. Moreover, 
since X0 is an optimal fiow, ex o :::; ex*. Thus ex0 = ex*, and x* is also an optimal 
flow. This arguments shows that if G(x*) contains no negative cycle, then x* must 
be optimal, and this conclusion completes the proof of the theorem. D 
For further details and examples, the interested reader may directly refer to 
Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin, 1993. 
5.3 Relationships with MCFP 
According to Theorems 3 and 4, the optimal solutions of BLPP (2) can be charac-
terized in terms of Nash equilibrium points. In this section, it is shown the tight 
relationship of a Nash equilibrium point with the solution of a particular MCFP. 
Let us introduce the following definition: 
Definition 8 Define Gr(x, y) = (N, Ar) as the residual network of G with respeet 
to the fiows x,y, where the areset is Ar = {(i,j) : (i,j) V (j,i) E A}. The are 
capacities and costs are defined according to the following Table 5.1: 
l (i,j) E AP l (j,i) E AP l (i,j) E AQ l (j,i) E AQ 
Capacity Uij- Xij X·· ~J uii- Yii Yii 
Costs pp QP eij 'eii pp QP -eii '-eii QQ PQ eij 'eii QQ PQ -eii '-eii 
Table 5.1: Are capacities and costs of the residual network Gr(x, y) 
Trivially, Gr(x, y) represents the network of the residual capacities that can be 
stili used o n the network G given the fiows x, y. Accordingly, de fine Gf (x) an d G~ (y) 
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the residual subnetworks corresponding to subnetworks GP and GQ, respectively. 
As an example, consider the network in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1.a) shows a network 
G and a feasible flow on i t. Let the black arcs of G belong to A P an d the grey arcs to 
A Q. Each are (i, j) E A P is characterized by a cou p le of val ues (c~ P, Uij), indicated 
near the are, and by the value c~P that is assumed equal to c~P, e.g., the are (s, A) 
has c~f = c~J = l an d uii = 2. Similarly, each are (i, j) E A Q is characterized by 
a couple of values ( c;Q, Uij) and c~Q = c~Q. Let node s be the origin and t be the 
destination with b~ = 2 and bf = -2, respectively. Finally, let the thick arcs in 
G indicate arcflow different from zero. In particular, XsA = XsB = Xct = XDt = l 
and YAc = YBD = l. Figure 5.1.b) shows the residual network Gr(x, y) induced 
to the above described feasible ·flow. The values (c~ P, uii) or ( c~Q, Uij) are again 
represented dose to the arcs. 
The following theorem allows to practically identify a N ash equilibrium point. 
Theorem 9 A point (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium point for BLPP {2) if and only if 
the residual subnetworks c; (x) an d G~ (y) contai n no negative, with respect to the 
values cPP, and positive, with respect to the values cQQ, cost cycles, respectively. 
Proof Let us prove first the "only if" part by contradiction. Let (x, y) be a Nash 
equilibrium point. Then consider the frontier flow vector "" associateci to it and 
assume that a residual c;:(x) contains a negative cost cycle. Then, according to 
the Negative Cycle Optimal Conditions Theorem for the MCFP (see Section 5.2), 
player P can define a new flow x', which imposes the same frontier vector ""' such 
that cPPx' < cPPx. Being ""constant, the feasibility of (x,y) implies the feasibility 
of (x', y). Since cPP x'+ cPQY <cPP x+ cPQy, then (x, y) is nota Nash equilibrium 
point. Symmetrical arguments hold for player Q if G~(y) contains a positive cost 
cycle. 
Consider, now, the "if" part. Let (x, y) be given and since c;:(x) and G~(y) 
contain, respectively, no negative an d positive cost cycles, we prove t ha t (x, y) is a 
N ash equilibrium point. Consider player P ( symmetrical arguments hold for player 
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(6,2) }8 
a) 
Figure 5.1: a residual network 
Q). Since flows y are fixed, and hence the value of the frontier flows ~, Negative 
Cycle Optimal Conditions Theorem for the MCFP guarantees that P cannot define a 
different feasible solution x' such that cPP x' <cPP x. Being the cost component cPQY 
fixed by hypothesis, the previous argument proves that (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium 
point. D 
As an example, consider again the network in Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1.a) shows a 
feasible flow on it, minimal for player P, but which is not a Nash equilibrium point. 
Actually, the residua! subnetwork G~(y) contains a positive cost cycle, as shown by 
the thick arcs in Figure 5.2.a). The cost of the cycle is 17 and the maximum flow 
that can circuiate in it values one. The thick arcs in Figure 5.2.b) show the new 
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feasible flow (x, y') that is also a Nash equilibrium point. Such a flow is obtained 
summing the arcflow defined by the positive cycle to the original flow (x, y). In 
(x, y') all the non null arcflows are equal t o one. 
(-1,1) 
~ (1,1) ~) 
a) 
~1,2) 
~1,1) 
b) 
Figure 5.2: A positive cycle and an equilibrium flow 
The following definitions and results, given a Nash equilibrium point, allow to 
determine a new o ne associa t ed to a different frontier flow vector, when i t exists. 
Definition 9 Define G(x, y) = (N, A) as the network of the residual paths of G 
with respect to the fiows (x, y), where the set of arcs A includes a pair of directed 
arcs (i, j)P, (j, i)Q for each ordered pair of nodes i, j E N such that there exists a 
directed path form i t o j in c; (x, y) an d a a directed path form j t o i in G~ (x, y). 
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Eaeh are (i, j)P has assoeiated a eost c~,j)P eorresponding t o the eost of the mini mal 
path from i to j on the residual network Gf(x). Besides, it has assoeiated a eost 
c~,j)P equal to the eost of the previously identified path when evaluated with eosts 
eQP. Aeeordingly, eaeh are (j, i)Q has a eost c3,i)Q eorresponding to the eost of the 
maximal path from j t o i o n the residual network G~ (y) and i t has also assoeiated 
a eost c[;,i)Q equal to the eost of the previously identified path when evaluated with 
eosts ePQ. Eaeh are has also a eapaeity ù equal t o the minimum eapaeity of the ares 
of the assoeiated path. 
Definition 10 Given G(x, y) = (N, A), define as an alternating cycle a ( direeted) 
eycle C made of an are (i, j)P and an are (j, i) Q. Finally, de fine also Dc the capacity 
of an alternating eycle C as the minimum eapaeity of the ares defining C. 
Figure 5.3.a) shows the network of the residual path G(x, y') induced by the 
fiow in Figure 5.2.b). In particular, the thick arcs highlight a feasible fiow (xc, Yc) 
of value l in an alternating cycle with negative cost -14 with respect to <PP. Here 
and in the following, with an abuse of notation, (xc, Yc) indicate both a feasible fiow 
in the alternating cycle C of G(x, y') and the fiow of equal value on the arcs of G 
defining the two paths which compose C. 
Theorem 10 Given a Nash equilibrium point (x, y), assume that the assoeiated 
network of the residual paths G(x, y) has an alternating eycle C, with Dc > O. 
Then, any point (x +xc, y+yc), where (xc, Yc) is a feasible fiow for C, is a new Nash 
equilibrium point. 
Proof Any point (x+ xc, y+yc) is trivially feasible by construction. Let us now prove 
that it is a Nash equilibrium point by contradiction. Assume that (x+ Xc, y + Yc) is 
nota Nash equilibrium point. Then, by Theorem 9, there should exist either at least 
a negative cycle in Gf(x +Xc,) or at least a positive cycle in G~(y + Yc)· However, 
the existence of a negative cycle in Gf (x + xc) contradicts the minimality of the 
path associateci to the arcs in C. Symmetrical arguments hold fora positive cycle in 
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G~(y + Yc)· Actually, since (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium point, there are no negative 
cycles in G;!(x). Networks G;!(x) and G;!(x+xc) differ only fora path p(j, i) from a 
frontier node j to another frontier node i. Then any negative cycle must include at 
least a part of such a path. Such an argument implies the contradiction that there 
exists a path form i to j o n G~ (x) which is less expensive t han the one associa t ed 
to (i,j)P. D 
The thick arcs in Figure 5.3.b) show the new feasible flow (x+ Xc, y' + Yc) that 
is also a Nash equilibrium point. Such a flow is obtained summing the flow (x, y') 
in Figure 5.2. b) with the one defined by the alternating cycle highlighted in Figure 
5.3.a). In (x+ Xc, y' + Yc) all the non null arcflows are equal to one except the one 
on are (D, t) which is equal to 2. 
5.4 A heuristic algorithm 
In this section, an upper bound to the optimal solution to BLPP (2) is proposed 
when the subnetwork cP is disconnected. In this context, a modification of the basic 
Cycle-Cancelling algorithm for MCFP problems based on Negative Cycle Optimal 
Conditions Theorem for the MCFP is introduced. Our algorithm, as the originai one 
for MCFP, turns out to be pseudopolynomial, but it can be reduced to be polynomial 
by appropriate scaling of the network parameters. This reduction is identica! to the 
corresponding one used for the algorithms of the MCFP, then it is not reported in 
this work. The interested reader may refer again to Ahuja, Magnanti and Orlin, 
1993. 
First the concept of a network without negative P cycles is stated. 
Definition 11 A residual network Gr(x, y) is defined as negative P cycle free if 
none of the following conditions is true: 
{i) there is a positive cycle in G~ (y); 
{ii) there is a negative cycle in c;: (x); 
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fi' (o' 1 ) ( -4' 1 ) ( -13' 1 ) ( -1 5' 1 ) (-2' 1 ) ( -1 ' 1 ) ( 1 ' 1 ) 
a) 
f:"J1,2) 
~1,1) 
~/J 
b) 
~/=:-\ (19,2) 
~(4,1) 
(6,2)0 
Figure 5.3: An alternating cycle and the induced equilibrium fiow 
(iii) there is an alternating cycle in G(x, y) such that the sum of the costs <PP of 
the arcs of the cycle is negative. 
According to this definition, the following result holds: 
Theorem 11 For any optimal solution (x, y) to BLPP {2)7 the corresponding resid-
ua[ network Gr(x, y) is negative P cycle free. 
Proof Since an optimal solution of BLPP (2) is a Nash equilibrium point (Theorem 
6), the residual subnetworks G~(x) and G~(y) contain no negative and positive cost 
cycles, respectively (Theorem 9). Hence the first two conditions are fulfilled. The 
third condition is proved by contradiction. If (x, y) is an optimal solution point, 
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assume t ha t there exists an alternating cycle C in G (x, y) su eh t ha t the sum of 
the costs cP of the are of the cycle is negative. Then Theorem 10 guarantees the 
existence of a different Nash equilibrium point (x+ xc, y + Yc) with an associateci 
frontier fiow ~c. By construction of C, cPP (x + xc) + cPQ (y + Yc) < cPP x + cPQ y, 
then the new Nash equilibrium point (x+ xc, y + Yc) is preferred by P and can be 
obtained by imposing the fiow x + Xc which, in turn, imposes ~c. Hence (x, y) is 
not an optimal solution to BLPP (2). D 
On the basis of the above Theorem 11, starting from a feasible fiow in G(N, A) 
the following algorithm determines a Nash equilibrium point and moves, if it exists 
an alternating cycle in G(x, y) such that the sum of the costs c/JP of the arcs of 
the cycle is negative, to another N ash equilibrium point improving the value of cPP. 
Sin ce these are points in player Q rational reaction set RQ (x), they belong t o the 
inducible region IRQ identifying an upper bound t o the optimal solution of BLPP 
(2). When no negative P cycles can be determined, the algorithm stops in a local 
optimum. 
ALGORITHM Cycle Cancelling 
l. determine an initial feasible fiow (x0 , y0 ) and set k = O 
2. look for negative P cycles C and modify the fiow adding to (xk, yk) the max-
imum circulation (xc,yc) feasible for C obtaining (xk+l,yk+l) = (xk,yk) + 
(xc,yc) 
3. set k = k + l and repeat step 2 until no negative P cycles can be determined. 
The algorithm term1nates in a finite number of steps. The initial feasible flow 
(x0 , y0 ) is detected, as an example, first relaxing the bilevellinear problem by drop-
ping the lower level objective function and solving the corresponding Minimum Cost 
Flow Problem over the whole network. If ties for player Q choice exist, zero cost 
cycles with respect to the values cQQ in G~(y) may be detected. In this case, under 
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the assumption of a cooperative attitude of player Q, a Nash equilibrium point is 
reached when in G~ (y) none of the zero cost cycles with respect t o cQQ is a negative 
cost cycle with respect to cPQ. Hence the algorithm has to be slightly modified to 
encompass this situation. 
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Chapter 6 
The freight traffic 
The road freight traffic from Turkey to Centrai and Western Europe and vice versa 
suffered major disruptions because of the war in Balkans during the nineties. The In-
ternational Transporters' Association of Turkey is the shipper controlling the quasi-
totality of this traffic thus assuming the role of player P. He had to cope with an 
"adverse entity" able to modify the available capacity on some specific links his ve-
hicles had to pass through. The region involved in the conflict may be represented 
as a connected subnetwork disconnecting the origin and the destinations of the road 
transportation network since alternative road routes are not easily affordable. Other 
possibilities, like the seaborne links now operating, did not exist at that time. Hence 
the whole freight traffic was performed using a single mode of transport. The mod-
els developed in this work allow the shipper to perform a worst-case analysis at 
the strategie level for this situation assuming that player Q wishes to maximize the 
costs he has to afford when going through the region under her control. In fact, it 
is meaningless to talk about the utility or the profit the war may seek to maximize. 
However, i t becomes a sensible modelling when the utility of player Q is strictly 
related to the costs afforded by player P on this portion of the network. lf player 
Q is maximizing her utility which corresponds to player P's costs, automatically 
she plays to maximize player P's costs. Hence the model represents a worst-case 
analysis for player P. 
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The situation UND had to face when the war in the Balkans started motivates our 
investigation on network games when handling uncertainty in the analysis of traffic 
and transportation systems at the strategie level is a major concern. As highlighted 
in Chapter 3, we propose an approach which extends and merges together results 
from different contexts. In Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5 we prove originai theorems 
and implementa new heuristic algorithm. However, as described in Chapter 7 where 
some possible further research lines are introduced, some model refinements and 
advances are necessary to correctly depict the whole complexity of the shipper's past 
and present actual behavior. In fact, we do not address all the aspects and details 
of the actual freight transportation system, but we provide a sound theoretical 
framework to capture some of its main properties. In this context, this dissertation 
might be considered as a building block to be later exploited and further expanded 
when the modelling of the whole complex system is required. To this aim, relying on 
actual and updated data, we build a simplified graph representing the road network 
under study, even though some strict assumptions had to be introduced. Hence 
the results provided in Section 6.3 give an estimate of the economie advantages the 
shipper may benefit when modelling the worst-case analysis as an adverse player 
and solving the game with bilevel linear programming. 
In the next Section 6.1, the main aspects of the road freight traffic within the 
existing freight transportation framework are briefly outlined. The following Section 
6.2 provides the relevant assumption, information and data used in the graph con-
struction. Finally, in Section 6.3 the Cycle Cancelling algorithm has been applied to 
the network just introduced and its results have been compared with the outcome 
obtained by using an exact enumeration procedure. Since it turns out that the per-
centage errar of the heuristic algorithm is equal to c% < O, 5%, we may claim that 
its performances are certainly highly satisfactory, at least in this specific example. 
65 
6.1 Description of the system 
The main features of the road freight transportation system of the Republic of 
Turkey are now introduced. Since the most complete and updated data set backs 
to 1997, all the data are referred to this specific year and may be found in "Annual 
Report of UND 1997-1998" published in 1999. 
The foreign trade of Thrkey as per transport modalities is shown in the following 
Table 6.1. The export and import flows measured in terms of thousands of tons are 
represented considering both the turkish and foreign flag carriers. 
Export Import 
Modality TR Flag Others TR Flag Others T o tal % 
Sea 7.334 14.676 26.438 47.100 95.548 87,2% 
Railway 145 6 96 85 332 0,3% 
Road 4.791 1.643 3.325 1.811 11.570 10,6% 
Airway 67 48 194 140 449 0,4% 
Others 61 o 1.604 18 1.683 1,5% 
Total 12.398 16.373 31.657 49.156 109.582 100,0% 
Table 6.1: Foreign Trade of Thrkey as per Transport Modalities in 1997 
The last column indicates the incidence of each transport mode out of the total 
foreign trade and shows that the road transport is the second mode for freight trans-
port accounting for a little more than 10% out of the total. Within this transport 
modality, the turkish flag carriers handle 8.116.588 thousands of tons representing 
the 70,1% of the freight transported by road. 
In this context, UND (Uluslararasi Nakliyeciler Dernegi, i.e., International Trans-
porters' Association) is the largest turkish association of the sector. In fact, 87% of 
transport companies active at internationallevel are UND members. Their number 
increases each year: from 375 members in 1993 to 623 members in 1997 and 794 in 
1998. Since the breakdown of the freight transported by UND members and UND 
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non members is not available, we approximate by saying that all the road freight 
traffic is performed by UND members. Hence UND is a shipper which controls 7,4% 
of the overall freight traffic of Turkey. UND fieet is composed of 23.629 tractors and 
28.915 (semi-) trailers, 4. 789 trucks and 640 tankers providing a payload capacity 
of 697.588 thousands of tons. In 1997, UND vehicles globally made 375.181 trans-
ports. Each transport can be made in two different ways: either it is completely 
a road transport, either part of it is performed by road and in the remaining part 
the vehicle is load o n a RO-RO vessel. Some destinations are reached only by road 
(e.g., Iran and Middle East). By contrast, European countries and the Republics of 
the former Soviet Union are connected either by road either by RO-RO lines. 
Since we are interested in the way the shipper afforded the Balkans war during 
the nineties, the freight traffic between Turkey and Centrai and Western Europe 
is considered. Detailed data are available for the export component only, i.e., from 
Turkey towards Europe. Obviously, similar analysis may be performed for the freight 
traffic in the apposite direction. Table 6.2 depicts the breakdown of UND export 
transports as per aggregate destinations in 1997. 
Destination Export transports 
Euro p e 110.028 
Middle East 35.211 
Ex Soviet U nion 71.532 
Total 216.771 
Table 6.2: UND Export Transports as per Aggregate Destinations in 1997 
According to 1997 figures, approximately 65.000 (i. e., 59%) of these road trans-
ports to Europe actually perform its entire travel by road. The remaining 41% loads 
the vehicles o n RO-RO vessels operating o n four different lines connecting Tur key 
to Italy. The total number of trips to be considered is further reduced because ca. 
15.000 journeys end before entering or inside the Balkans. Hence the final amount of 
fiow units passing through the region controlled by the adverse entity and reaching 
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Centrai and Western Europe is nearly equal to 50.000 transports. 
6.2 A simple graph 
According to the assumptions made in Section 1.2 and in Chapter 4, the bilevel 
linear games under study apply to a single origin, single destination and acyclic net-
work disconnected by the region controlled by the adverse entity. At the aggregate 
strategie level, this framework depicts to some extent the situation UND faces when 
considering the fiow from Thrkey and the North West of Europe. This destination 
far from the Balkan region has also been chosen to make the network not too trivial, 
i.e., with a significant number of nodes and arcs in both the player P and Q regions. 
Hence the total traffic taken into account from 50.000 units is further reduced to 
28.000 vehicles and an acyclic network which includes a single source (Thrkey) and a 
single sink ( near Paris) is considered. As a further assumption, for balancing the size 
of sub-networks GP and GQ in terms of number of arcs and nodes, the adverse region 
has been enlarged and comprehends countries which were not directly involved in 
war operations (i.e., Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic 
and Eastern Austria). 
The graph is composed of 99 nodes and 181 arcs. The nodes differentiate in 
10 frontiers nodes (Table 6.4), 36 nodes in the subnetwork GQ (Table 6.3) and 53 
nodes in the subnetwork GP (Table 6.5). Actually, for modelling purposes each node 
representing a country border gate is split in two parts and a dummy are connecting 
these two nodes has been inserted. For sake of clarity, only one of these two nodes 
is shown in the just mentioned Tables. 
Player P controls a subnetwork composed of 100 arcs. The others 81 links rep-
resenting the connections within the Balkans and Eastern Europe form a connected 
subnetwork. In Figure 6.1 the network layout is provided. The dark arcs belong to 
region P an d the light arcs are controlled by player Q. Only the main road links 
have been considered (motorways or highways). The capacities are calculated taking 
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into account the total number of transit permits available for each country. This 
figure is annually fixed in bilatera! Joint Committee Meetings. Player P's costs, 
cPP an d cPQ, are the aver age generalized costs derived as a function of lengths an d 
transfer times in the physicallinks. Since player Q does not have profits or losses for 
the fl.ows passing through the P zone, cQP are set equal to zero. It is also assumed 
that the profits she earns for each unit of fl.ow going through the arcs under her 
control are equal to the costs afforded by the shipper when traversing these arcs, 
i. e., cQQ = -cPQ. All the relevant data required to calculate these figures are col-
lected in the UND Annual Sector Report 1997-98. In Table 6.6 and Table 6. 7, the 
origin and destination nodes of each are are identified for both regions. The values 
of cPP or cQQ ( thousands of Italian Lira) an d uP or uQ ( thousands of vehicles) are 
also provided for each link. Dummy arcs connecting the two nodes representing a 
national border gate are also shown. 
N ode L abel N ode L abel N ode L abel 
105 GR-YU 125 Praha 198 Szeghed 
106 BG-YU 147 Salzburg 199 Sibiu 
107 BG-R (Ruse) 187 R-H 207 Beo gr ad 
108 BG-R (Siret) 188 SLO-A 230 Botevgrad 
109 Nis 190 Skopje 232 Caransebes 
110 Bucarest 191 Cacak 233 Craiova 
112 Ljubljana 192 Titograd 234 Hateg 
113 SLO-H 193 Dubrovnik 235 Timisoara 
114 Budapest 194 Sarajevo 236 Se bes 
117 H-A 195 Novisad 237 Brasov 
118 Wien 196 Zadar 238 Thrda 
119 H-SK 197 Zagreb 239 Oradea 
Table 6.3: Nodes in GQ 
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N ode L abel N ode La bel 
102 TR-GR (Ipsala) 141 1-SLO 
103 TR-BG (Kapikule) 143 1-A (Tarvisio) 
104 TR-BG (Derekoy) 148 A-D (Salzsburg) 
124 D-CZ 158 A-D (Passau) 
140 Trieste 206 Dresden 
Table 6.4: Frontier nodes 
N ode L abel N ode L abel N ode L abel 
l Turkey 155 Koln 205 Jena 
2 France 156 D-B 208 Stuttgart 
100 lzmit 157 Bruxelles 231 Portile de Fier 
101 Istanbul 158 F-B 240 Bellinzona 
136 Genova 159 Amsterdam 241 Bad Ragaz 
137 I-F (Ventimiglia) 160 D-NL 242 Ulm 
138 Milano 161 Osnabri.ick 243 Ansbach 
139 Verona 173 Narbonne 244 Wi.irzburg 
142 Palmanova 174 Oange 245 Frankfurt 
144 1-F (Frejus) 175 Lyon 246 Dortmund 
145 1-A (Brennero) 176 Dijon 247 Clermont Ferrand 
146 A-D (Innsbruck) 177 Bordeaux 248 Brive 
149 Miinich 178 Paris 249 Fontainebleau 
150 Linz 200 Ziirich 250 Orleans 
151 A-D (Passau) 201 Poi tiers 251 Le Mans 
152 Niirberg 202 Toulouse 252 Rennes 
153 Berlin 203 Metz 253 Nantes 
154 Hannover 204 Kassel 
Table 6.5: Nodes in GP 
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ON DN cPP uP ON DN cPP up ON DN cPP up ON DN cPP uP ON DN cPP up 
l 100 81 1000 149 242 806 66 175 176 1337 14 208 203 2194 66 247 250 3738 14 
100 101 908 1000 152 243 292 66 175 200 3285 14 208 155 2604 66 248 177 2413 14 
101 l 02 3688 l 000 152 243 292 66 175 247 2250 14 208 245 1403 66 248 201 2638 14 
101 103 3530 1000 152 205 1368 66 176 249 1604 14 240 241 1348 66 249 178 535 14 
101 104 377 4 1000 152 204 2488 66 177 201 1757 14 240 200 1208 42 250 178 1027 14 
124 152 941 66 153 154 2594 66 178 2 81 1000 241 242 1768 66 250 253 2696 14 
136 137 1372 24 154 161 965 66 200 176 3089 14 241 200 632 40 250 251 1725 14 
137 1371 627 1000 155 159 1813 66 200 208 1768 66 242 243 1411 66 251 178 1785 14 
138 136 1258 24 155 156 941 66 201 250 1486 14 242 208 528 66 252 251 1330 14 
138 144 2307 24 156 1561 627 1000 201 253 2238 14 243 208 l 097 66 253 251 1598 14 
138 240 847 24 157 1581 528 18 202 177 1736 14 243 244 729 66 253 252 946 14 
139 145 2116 24 158 178 2119 14 202 248 2663 14 244 204 1097 66 1371 17 4 2823 14 
139 138 1328 24 159 157 1803 7 203 1561 1882 18 244 245 896 66 1411 140 132 24 
140 142 440 24 160 1601 627 1000 203 178 2299 14 245 246 1486 66 1461 149 677 66 
142 139 2049 24 161 155 986 66 204 154 1507 66 245 155 1188 66 1461 241 17 41 40 
143 142 827 24 161 160 667 66 204 246 1389 66 246 154 1236 66 1481 149 1170 66 
144 1441 627 1000 173 247 5050 14 205 204 1319 66 246 155 535 66 1511 152 1891 66 
145 1451 627 1000 173 202 1014 14 205 153 1389 66 247 249 3863 14 1561 157 941 18 
146 1461 627 1000 174 173 1645 14 206 153 1118 66 247 248 2325 14 1581 158 627 1000 
149 152 1433 66 174 175 1733 14 206 205 1014 66 247 201 3625 14 1601 159 1627 7 
Table 6.6: Arcs in GP 
ON DN CQQ UQ ON DN CQQ UQ ON DN CQQ UQ ON DN CQQ UQ ON DN CQQ UQ 
102 1021 627 1000 117 1171 627 1000 190 109 1661 39 230 231 3713 6 1031 107 8642 6 
103 1031 627 1000 118 150 1583 40 191 192 3922 39 230 106 788 6 1041 108 5209 6 
104 1041 627 1000 118 125 2563 40 191 194 2906 39 231 233 1475 42 1051 190 1850 39 
105 1051 627 1000 118 143 4053 40 192 193 2859 39 231 232 1350 42 1061 109 1288 39 
106 1061 627 1000 119 1191 627 1000 193 194 4825 39 232 234 900 42 1071 110 918 42 
107 1071 627 1000 125 206 1875 14 193 196 5906 39 233 110 2036 42 1131 113 627 1000 
107 230 4563 6 125 1241 2483 14 194 195 1775 39 233 234 3234 42 1171 118 541 40 
108 1081 627 1000 141 1411 627 1000 195 197 3455 39 234 236 500 42 1241 124 627 1000 
109 207 2938 39 143 1431 627 1000 196 197 4484 39 234 235 2750 42 1431 14 7 2231 40 
110 237 2125 42 147 148 108 40 196 140 4703 39 235 199 797 42 1441 175 2587 14 
110 236 3363 42 148 1481 627 1000 197 140 2339 5 236 199 2700 42 1451 146 1256 40 
112 141 783 3 150 147 1249 40 197 112 1688 5 236 238 1734 42 1871 114 3229 39 
112 188 718 3 150 151 844 40 198 195 2913 39 237 238 3984 42 1881 143 488 40 
113 112 2261 3 151 1511 627 1000 199 198 1313 39 238 239 2275 42 
114 117 1919 39 187 1871 627 1000 199 187 688 42 239 199 1463 42 
114 119 1148 39 188 1881 627 1000 207 195 382 39 1021 105 6529 10 
114 1131 3975 39 190 191 1488 39 207 235 1975 39 1031 106 5152 6 
Table 6. 7: Arcs in GQ 
IJ 
o 
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6.3 Numerica! experiments 
Since cQQ = -cPQ, multiple optima for player Q do not vary the value of cpP. 
Thus the following steps of the Cycle Cancelling Algorithm described in Section 5.4 
identify a local optimum: 
l. An initial feasible flow (x0 , y0 ) is detected first relaxing the bilevellinear prob-
lem by dropping the lower level objective function and solving the correspond-
ing Minimum Cost Flow Problem over the whole network. The generalized 
cost obtained is 1.063. 710 Miti. Then, given the divergences a t the frontier 
nodes, the Maximum Cost Flow Problem is solved for the Q region. At the 
equilibrium point, the cost to be afforded by the shipper turns out to be equal 
to 1.385.868 Mltl. Note that, the presence of negative (positive) cycles in 
G;'(x) (G~(y)) is ruled out due to the minimality (maximality) ofthe solution 
just obtained for the P (Q) region. 
2. A first alternating cycle C1 is identified. Then, adding to (x0 , y0 ) the maxi-
mum circulation ( Xcu Ycl) feasible for cl' a new equilibrium point (x\ y1) = 
(x0 , y0 ) +(x eu Yc1 ) is obtained. The new value of P objective function is equal 
to 1.370.979 Mltl. 
3. A second alternating cycle C2 is identified. Then, adding to (x1 , y1) the max-
imum circulation (xc2 , Yc2 ) feasible for C2 , a new equilibrium point (x2 , y2 ) = 
(x\ y1) + (xc2 , Yc2 ) is obtained. The new value of P objective function is equal 
to 1.329.003 Mltl. 
4. No further alternating cycles exist, then the algorithm stops. 
The global optimum value for the considered problem is 1.324.927 Mltl and is 
obtained with a branch-and-bound procedure. Hence, the percentage error is equal 
to c% < O, 5%. The first rational solution used to initialize the branch-and-bound 
procedure was the one defining the equilibrium point at step l of the above Cycle 
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Cancelling Algorithm. The same procedure, after exploring less than ten nodes of 
the enumeration tree, determines the solution whose value is 1.370.979 Mitl. Finally, 
after visiting 1.247 nodes the optimal solution is established. 
These results prove the benefit of such bilevel linear programming modelling. 
The generalized cost obtained relaxing the bilevel linear problem by dropping the 
lower level objective function and solving the corresponding Minimum Cost Flow 
Problem over the whole network depicts the case where the shipper fully controls 
all the arcs of the network his flow goes through. U nfortunately, this favorable 
situation has to be ruled out when an adverse entity imposes her assignment on 
some given arcs. If the shipper is aware of such hostile attitude, some actions to 
prevent it has to be taken. In fact, if player Q is freely allowed to reassign the flow 
in her region without any further moves from player P, his costs would increase 
by 30%. When the shipper starts solving the bilevellinear programming game by 
identifying new Nash equilibrium points, the first flow reassignment would lower his 
extra-costs to a value equal to 28% more than the minimum cost flow assignment. 
In the following, a second alternating cycle allows player P to detect a new Nash 
equilibrium point which leads to further reduction of his extra-costs to 24,8% more 
than the minimum cost flow assignment. Since no further alternating cycles exist, 
then the algorithm stops. As a consequence of this game, the shipper understands 
t ha t the perfect knowledge of the behavior of his hostile player allows him to prevent 
her moves minimizing his losses due to her actions on the subnetwork his units 
must go through. When the shipper is not able to solve the exact bilevel linear 
programming problem (e.g., because of the large size of the network), the heuristic 
algorithm detects in polynomial time a solution which is an upper bound for the 
global optimum. In the specific example under investigation the heuristic and the 
exact solutions are very close: only 0,3% far apart. 
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Chapter 7 
Further researches 
Different extensions of the models and the algorithm developed may be easily en-
visaged both from the theoretical and the application side. These advances would 
provide either faster local or global search algorithms either more complete models 
representing in deeper detail the actual system and the interactions among the actors 
involved. Hence a decision support system for the shipper's decision making pro-
cess at the strategie level can be built and effectively used by freight transportation 
practitioners. In this Section, we briefiy introduce the main lines of development to 
be possibly followed according to the issue we are more interested in. 
7 .l The Algorithm 
The heuristic algorithm introduced in Chapter 5 has been applied on a simple net-
work and in Section 6.3 its results have been compared with the outcome of a Branch 
& Bound procedure. In this specific case heuristics perform very well with a per-
centage error equal to 0,3% with respect to the global optimum. Of course, this 
comparison is affordable for small problem instances only, as for the network we 
propose in Section 6.2. As a further research on this issue, it would be interesting 
to test the algorithm on larger, more complex and topological different networks 
to possibly identify its average and worst-case performances. Instances specifically 
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devoted to be used as test-beds for network algorithms are available on the Internet 
and could be considered as a reliable starting point for this task. 
A further interesting investigation stems from the possibility to integrate our 
approach with other exact procedures and implement an ( enumeration) algorithm 
able to identify, on the average, in affordable time also the global optima of large 
instances of the two games. In fact, bilevellinear programming problems are N P-
hard problems, then the only certain way to attain a global optimum relies on 
enumeration algorithms. Bard (1998) provides an updated review of the main exact 
approaches for solving BLP problems. According to our main results, the new 
enumeration algorithm would restrict the search for the global optimal solution to 
the set of the N ash equilibrium points. In addition, i t would use the local optimum 
identified in polynomial time by the Cycle Cancelling Algorithm as an upper bound 
for pruning the Branch & Bound tree of the cost minimization problem. 
7. 2 The M o del 
Many developments are possible on this issue. Disregarding the initial main assump-
tions ( see Section l. 2) the investigation of the consequent extended models may be 
performed. 
• Costs We first drop the assumption that costs are data already given. It might 
be more realistic to consider the case where player Q decides not only on the 
are capacities but also on the are costs. In particular, the following situation 
may be depicted: player Q plays the role of an Authority looking for regulation 
of player P's freight traffic. For instance, she may decide to support a specific 
transport modality and discourage the usage of another one. This behavior 
can be accomplished by imposing tolls or fares on the links of the penalized 
mode such that the shipper would suffer higher costs when using i t rather than 
passing through the toll-free arcs. Hence player Q has to decide on which arcs 
( of the penalized mode) and a t which value the tolls should be fixed, provided 
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that her overall profit should attain at least a minimum level. If we further 
assume that player Q bears some expenses in the revenue collection phase, she 
would also minimize the number of her arcs where tolls or fares are imposed. In 
a simple network composed of a single origin and a single destination, player Q 
would solve a minimum capacity cut problem. When multi-origins and multi-
destinations are considered, the computational complexity increases and the 
problem becomes N P-hard. In addition, a decision on the are capacities has 
also to be taken when the adverse entity stili wishes to control the flow in the 
region under her contro l. As usual, to minimize the effects of these undesirable 
higher costs on his transport system, the shipper would play a bilevel linear 
programming game. 
• Disconnection A different modelling issue assumes that player Q network 
does not disconnect origin and destination. In this case, model (2) can no 
longer be derived from model (1). Hence the remaining of this work when 
player P plays first no longer holds. The three-stage model has to be faced and 
conditions for the existence of the optimal solution and methods to identify 
it have to be investigated. Finally, new algorithms to detect it have to be 
implemented. This extension would allow the shipper to partially or fully 
overcome the region controlled by the adverse entity and consider alternative 
routes which are completely under his control. In addition, different competing 
transport modalities between the same 0/D pairs may also be compared. 
• Competition At the strategie level, competition is often a major concern 
in the decision making process of any shipper. As we mentioned in Section 
3.2, some results on multi-level noncooperative games where several actors 
compete for taking portions of the link capacity over a network are available 
in the communication sector. U nfortunately, these models consider only a very 
simple network topology: a single origin and a single destination connected 
by parallel arcs. This basic structure is clearly unfit to depict transportation 
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environments. Indeed, the extension of this approach to a more general graph 
topology would provide an useful framework to be further exploited when 
modelling several actors in competition over the same network. 
• Minor issues More trivial extensions consider multiple origins an d/ or multi-
ple destinations. Also the assumption of acyclic network may be easily disre-
garded, provided that the appropriate algorithm to prevent positive cycles in 
the subgraph GQ is integrated. 
7.3 The Freight Traffic 
The situation UND had to face years ago when the Balkan war suddenly started 
gave us the stimulus to investigate the actions a shipper can take when he is not 
able to fully control all the arcs of network his goods go through. From the available 
data the network in Fig. 6.1 has been built and the Cycle Cancelling Algorithm has 
been test ed on this simple, but not trivial, real graph. However, the actual freight 
traffic system from Turkey to Europe could be investigated in more detail. 
As explained in the previous Chapter 6, all the data we referto are actual data 
and particular accuracy has been given to correctly define the average generalized 
costs and capacities of each are. Nevertheless some more refinement would be possi-
ble provided more complete data sources are available. In this field, similar advances 
calibrating the generalized cost function of a modal choice model comparing sea, road 
and rail freight transportation in the Adriatic sea context (with particular emphasis 
on the Port of Trieste) are currently under study (Dall'Acqua, 2002). 
Relying on the different theoretical modelling issues introduced in the previous 
Section 7.2 to be further developed in the future, we might expand our view to 
capture several aspects of the whole UND freight traffic system. First, the real multi-
origin and multi-destination network could be established. Second, all the different 
transportation modes used by UND vehicles could be considered simultaneously. In 
fact, by disregarding the disconnection property of GQ the actual competition among 
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road and seaborne paths can be represented. The interest in this line of research 
is also testified by some recent studies where a macra-economie analysis comparing 
the road and RO-RO transport in the Mediterranean (including the freight traffic 
from Turkey to Europe) is performed (Torbianelli, 2000). 
The comparison between the results obtained when performing the worst-case 
analysis and the actual system behavior is another important point to be further 
developed. However, difficulties arise because the freight traffic is continuously sub-
ject to major variations. On the sea side, the number of weekly calls at the Port 
of Trieste raised in the last year from 11 to 14. It means that the seaborne link 
increased its capacity by about 30.000 vehicles affecting shipper's decision making 
process at the strategie level. On the road side, the past and present international 
politica! situation has currently strong influence at each hierarchical level. At the 
strategie level, war operations quickly moved through different neighboring regions 
(i.e., Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia etc.) thus modifying different times the capacity 
of the same are. This prevented the adverse entity to attain a steady state. At the 
lower levels, the highly variable variance of the time spent in each trip to cross the 
several country border gates has always been a major concern. This situation even 
worsened after September 11, 2001, attacks. In fact, stricter regulations have been 
enforced far customs and anti-terrorism inspections. At the time being, we are not 
in the position to predict whether they would significantly affect ( e.g., as a large 
annual variation of the amount of vehicles through some specific are) the network 
when considering its aggregate view. By contrast, the acquisition of a new RO-RO 
vessel (a shipper's strategie decision) has certainly much more impact on his whole 
transport system. Because of this high degree of uncertainty and dynamic evolu-
tion of the environment wherein UND normally operates, stochastic and dynamic 
network models might be considered. 
80 
Chapter 8 
Conci usions 
Noncooperative games in their extensive form may be appropriate to support ship-
per strategie decisions when the whole transportation network is not under his full 
control. In this context, a game between two players acting on the same road 
transportation network is considered. The first player aims at minimizing the trans-
portation costs, whereas the second player aims at maximizing her profit (or, in 
generai, her utility) t ha t is proportional to the fl.ow passing through the arcs un-
der her control. This framework may describe, as an example, the situation where 
restrictions are imposed by some alpine country on the number of trucks allowed 
to cross it by road each year. A different context involving the presence of a sec-
ond agent on the shipper's network occurred when the International Transporters' 
Association (UND) of Turkey had to face when the war in the Balkans started. 
The war is considered as an hostile player or on adverse entity introducing major 
limitations on the link capacities. The situation motivates our investigation on net-
work games when handling uncertainty in the analysis of traffi.c and transportation 
systems at the strategie level is a major concern. As highlighted in Chapter 3, we 
propose an approach which extends and merges together results from different con-
texts, namely multi-actor sequential models, network game models and bilevellinear 
programming models. The games under study are eventually modelled in Chapter 
4 as bilevel linear programming formulations. In Chapter 5 we prove that the op-
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timal solution of the bilevellinear programming problem under concern is a Nash 
equilibrium point. Relying on the Negative Cycle Optimality Conditions, original 
theorems and properties identifying such Nash equilibria have been proved. This 
results allowed to define the Cycle Cancelling algorithm which is a heuristic algo-
rithm detecting a local optimum only, i.e., un upper bound for the global optimum. 
In Chapter 6 the Cycle Cancelling algorithm has been tested on a simple network 
and its results have been compared with the outcome obtained by using an exact 
enumeration procedure. Since i t turns out that the percentage error of the heuristic 
algorithm is equal to 0,3 %, we may claim that its performances are certainly highly 
satisfactory, at least in this specific example. Even though some strict assumptions 
had to be introduced, the just mentioned graph has been built relying on actual and 
updated data related to road freight traffi.c from Thrkey to Western Europe. Hence 
it is given an estimate of the economie advantages the shipper may benefit when 
modelling the worst-case analysis as an adverse player and solving the game with 
bilevel linear programming. Different extensions of the models and the algorithm 
developed are described in Chapter 7 both from the theoretical and the application 
side. These advances would provide either faster local or global search algorithms 
either more complete models representing in deeper detail the actual system and 
the interactions among the actors involved. Hence a decision support system for the 
shipper's decision making process at the strategie level can be built and effectively 
used by freight transportation practitioners. 
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